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Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández* 
Only recently has imprisonment become a central feature of 
both civil and criminal immigration law enforcement. Apart from 
harms to individuals and communities arising from other types of 
immigration enforcement, such as removal, imprisonment comes with 
its own severe consequences, and yet it is relatively ignored. This 
Article is the first to define a new prison population as those 
imprisoned as a result of suspected or actual immigration law 
violations, whether civil or criminal—a population that now numbers 
more than half a million individuals a year. It is also the first to 
systematically map the many civil and criminal entryways into 
immigration imprisonment across every level of government. 
Examining the population of immigration prisoners as a whole 
provides crucial insights into how we arrived at this state of large-
scale immigration imprisonment. While political motivations similar 
to those that fueled the rapid expansion of criminal hyper-
incarceration may have started the trend, this Article demonstrates 
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that key legal and policy choices explain how imprisonment has 
become an entrenched feature of immigration law enforcement. In 
fact, legislators and immigration officials have locked themselves 
into this choice: there are now billions of dollars, tens of thousands 
of prison beds, and hundreds of third parties invested in maintaining 
and expanding the use of immigration imprisonment. Using the 
literature on path dependence and legal legitimacy, this Article 
explains the phenomenon of immigration imprisonment as a single 
category that spans all levels of government. The Article concludes 
by suggesting that policy makers, rather than continuing further 
along this path, should seek a future that reflects immigration law 
enforcement’s past—when imprisonment was the exception rather 
than the norm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Immigration law enforcement is a feature of both the civil administrative 
law process and the criminal justice system. On the civil side, federal 
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immigration officials in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) use an 
array of initiatives, tens of thousands of personnel, and billions of dollars to 
enforce civil immigration law, which governs who can be admitted into the 
United States and what conditions they must meet to stay here.
1
 In the criminal 
justice system, the same federal agencies that investigate and enforce all types 
of federal criminal laws also police suspected violations of federal immigration 
crimes, such as unauthorized entry and unauthorized reentry into the United 
States.
2
 State and local counterparts often engage in similar activities, having 
vigorously turned to their traditional police powers to regulate unwanted 
activity related to migrant status.
3
 
Whether characterized as a matter of civil or criminal law, and whether 
carried out by federal, state, or local officials, every type of immigration law 
enforcement shares a common central feature: imprisonment.
4
 While 
differences exist, the government subjects all immigration prisoners to its 
coercive powers through forcible confinement in secure facilities where 
detainees are closely watched and access is limited. The vast majority of people 
detained due to immigration law violations are held in jails, prisons, or other 
secure facilities that are modeled on those designed for prisoners awaiting 
criminal proceedings or serving sentences. Not surprisingly, all of the criminal 
detainees are kept in jails and prisons. Roughly half of the approximately 250 
facilities where DHS holds civil immigration detainees function as jails and 
prisons that do not purport to be anything but penal institutions. Most of DHS’s 
remaining civil immigration detainees are confined in secure structures 
designed to include many of the hallmarks of prisons and jails: involuntary 
confinement, strictly controlled access, barbed wire, steel doors, closely 
watched movements, and more.
5
 
Every year, these facilities house vast numbers of people. In the criminal 
context, the United States Marshals Service (USMS), the federal agency 
responsible for detaining people suspected of violating federal criminal law, 
arrested and booked 82,255 people for a suspected immigration offense in 
 
 1. See infra Part II.A. 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. See infra Part II.C. 
 4. In this Article, “imprisonment” is an umbrella term that includes any form of secure 
confinement regardless of which governmental unit carries out the confinement, the legal authority 
that permits it, or the stringency of the conditions of confinement. See Matthew Groves, Immigration 
Detention vs Imprisonment: Differences Explored, 29 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 228, 229 (2004) (“The core 
elements of imprisonment are forced detention and coercive treatment.”). “Detention” and 
“immigration detention,” in contrast, refer to confinement through ICE’s civil administrative law 
enforcement powers. See Robyn Sampson & Grant Mitchell, Global Trends in Immigration Detention 
and Alternatives to Detention: Practical, Political and Symbolic Rationales, 1 J. ON MIGRATION & 
HUM. SECURITY 97, 99 (2013). I use “confinement” and “incarceration” interchangeably to signify the 
experience of forcible living in a secured environment where volitional entry and exit are not allowed. 
 5. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009). 
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fiscal year 2010, 83,206 in fiscal year 2011, and 85,458 in fiscal year 2012.
6
 
Though several immigration-related crimes exist, the most commonly 
prosecuted include unauthorized entry (a federal misdemeanor) and 
unauthorized reentry (a federal felony).
7
 
Additionally, convicted immigration offenders have risen as a percentage 
of the federal prison population, hitting 12 percent in 2012 when 23,700 people 
convicted of an immigration crime spent time in a federal prison on a given 
day.
8
 Some states have taken immigration law matters into their own hands by 




Alongside criminal incarceration, DHS used its civil immigration 
detention authority to confine 477,523 people in fiscal year 2012
10
—the largest 
civil immigration detention population in modern times.
11
 DHS confined these 
individuals for alleged violations of civil immigration law provisions (e.g., 
being physically present in the United States without authorization).
12
 In total, 
hundreds of thousands of people are incarcerated each year for allegedly 
engaging in nonviolent immigration activity prohibited by state or federal civil 
or criminal law—or, in some instances, both. These violations range from 
entering the United States without the federal government’s permission to 
using an invented social security number to gain employment. 
Evidence shows that migrants suffer unthinkable harms while 
imprisoned.
13
 At the same time, policies regulating migration have not only 
remained indifferent to these realities, but have become increasingly punitive 
over the last thirty years. 
 
 6. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248493, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
2011–2012, at 3 tbl.2 (2015). 
 7. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326 (2012). 
 8. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 243920, 
PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012, at 43 app. tbl.10 (2013) 
(providing federal prison population data for individuals sentenced to more than one year 
imprisonment and incarcerated on December 31 of 2002, 2011, and 2012). On December 31, 2011, 
there were 22,043 people imprisoned because of a federal immigration crime and on that date in 2002 
there were 15,628 such prisoners. Id. 
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
 10. JOHN F. SIMANSKI & LESLEY M. SAPP, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL 
REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2012, at 5 (2013). 
 11. This is likely the largest civil immigration detention population ever in the United States, 
but reliable data for the late-nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century are unavailable. 
 12. See INA § 212(a)(6) (rendering inadmissible any migrant who was not admitted or paroled 
into the United States); id. § 237(a)(1)(B) (rendering deportable any migrant present in the United 
States in violation of any INA provision). 
 13. As used in this Article, the term “migrant” refers to people who were not United States 
citizens when they physically entered the United States. See Nicholas De Genova, The Legal 
Production of Mexican/Migrant “Illegality,” in GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME 41, 41 
(Julie A. Dowling & Jonathan Xavier Inda eds., 2013). I use this term rather than “immigrant” because 
the latter has a specialized definition for purposes of immigration law that does not precisely conform 
to the individuals who this Article discusses. See INA § 101(a)(15). 
2015] NATURALIZING IMMIGRATION IMPRISONMENT 1453 
Imprisonment, then, befalls people who engage in prohibited 
immigration-related conduct through both criminal- and civil-law processes. 
Because confinement in these instances turns on migrant status or on activity 
inextricably tied to being a migrant (e.g., hiring someone to transport you 
clandestinely into the United States), viewing the practice of locking up 
migrants as a single, multi-stranded phenomenon of immigration imprisonment 
better reflects the reality of immigration law enforcement today than 
demarcating distinctions based on criminal- or civil-law powers. As former 
immigration detainee Malik Ndaula put it, to those locked up—the nation’s 
immigration prisoners—“prison is prison no matter what label you use.”
14
 
A number of explanations for immigration imprisonment’s remarkable 
scale pervade. Many commentators point to the 1996 amendments to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) that dramatically expanded the 
so-called “mandatory detention” provision. Some point to the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.
15
 Others argue that 
Congress’s insistence on a “bed mandate,” requiring DHS to pay for a specified 
number of detention beds every year, means DHS has no choice but to detain 
so many people.
16
 Still others claim that lobbyists for private prison 
corporations promote legislation to expand detention.
17
 
Though all of these explanations have some truth, none fully appreciate 
the depth, subtlety, and ingrained nature of the policy initiatives, legislative 
processes, statutory requirements, and administrative decisions that promote 
immigration imprisonment. As the first to systematically consider 
imprisonment as the defining feature of immigration law enforcement in the 
United States today, this Article provides the comprehensive picture of 
immigration imprisonment necessary to understand why so many people are 
confined for violating immigration laws. In doing so, it shows why and how 
 
 14. Malik Ndaula & Debbie Satyal, Rafiu’s Story: An American Immigrant Nightmare, in 
KEEPING OUT THE OTHER: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT TODAY 
241, 250 (David C. Brotherton & Philip Kretsedemas eds., 2008). 
 15. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 
45 HARV. CIV. RTS.–CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 601, 610–11 (2010) (explaining that the Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty of 1996 “toughened . . . immigration detention” and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 “expanded the scope of mandatory 
detention”); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After 
September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 89–91 (2005) (discussing the federal government’s 
use of immigration detention after September 11, 2001). 
 16. David Brancaccio, “Bed Mandate” Ensures 34,000 Immigrants Are Detained Each Day, 
MARKETPLACE (Oct. 18, 2013, 7:54 AM), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/economy/bed-mandate-
ensures-34000-immigrants-are-detained-each-day; Ted Robbins, Little-Known Immigration Mandate 
Keeps Detention Beds Full, NPR (Nov. 19, 2013, 3:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/19 
/245968601/little-known-immigration-mandate-keeps-detention-beds-full. 
 17. See William Selway & Margaret Newkirk, Congress’s Illegal-Immigration Detention 
Quota Costs $2 Billion a Year, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-09-26/congresss-illegal-immigration-detention-quota-
costs-2-billion-a-year; Graeme Wood, A Boom Behind Bars, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 17, 
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/11_13/b4221076266454.htm. 
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imprisonment has become a normal, routine, and self-replicating feature of 
immigration policing—that is, why and how immigration imprisonment has 
naturalized. 
The growth in criminal incarceration is well-established in the academic 
literature of multiple disciplines.
18
 In contrast, academic commentary, 




This Article makes three unique contributions to the imprisonment 
literature. First, it spans civil and criminal confinement to define a new form of 
imprisonment—immigration imprisonment. Immigration imprisonment can be 
usefully conceptualized as a single policy choice and analyzed as a whole, 
regardless of the legal process or government action from which the 
imprisonment may result. Second, for the first time, this Article maps the full 
list of pathways through which migrants are imprisoned by federal, state, or 
local government laws and practices. Third, the Article argues that, beyond 
political forces, institutional decision-making processes and legal directives 
propel the growth of immigration imprisonment and make it a naturalized 
phenomenon. 
To unravel imprisonment’s ingrained role in the modern immigration law 
enforcement regime, this Article proceeds in six parts. Part I lays out the 
personal and societal harms of imprisoning migrants for immigration-related 
activities that, unlike the conduct that drove criminal hyperincarceration,
20
 are 
often not criminal transgressions at all (they are violations of civil law) and 
almost never involve an easily discernible harm. Despite this, federal, state, and 
local governments have come to rely on confinement as a central means of 
enforcing immigration law. In doing so, they have created a population of 
people conceptualized in Part II as immigration prisoners. 
Part II identifies the civil and criminal powers federal and state 
governments wield to create the population of immigration prisoners. Federal, 
state, and local governments have used specific enforcement and prosecution 
 
 18. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); STEPHEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, WHY ARE SO 
MANY AMERICANS IN PRISON? (2013). 
 19. For notable exceptions in the legal scholarship, see Alina Das, Immigration Detention: 
Information Gaps and Institutional Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137 (2013); Heeren, supra 
note 15, at 610–11; Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 
(2010); Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for 
Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63 (2012). 
For my own earlier articulation of a theory of the political forces propelling immigration 
imprisonment’s growth, see generally César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 
2013 BYU L. REV. 1457. 
 20. See Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, 
DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 74, 78 (contending that “hyperincarceration” better describes the 
modern use of imprisonment in the United States than the more common “mass incarceration” because 
hyperincarceration accounts for imprisonment that is overwhelmingly used against poor black men). 
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initiatives to develop numerous entryways into the immigration-imprisonment 
pipeline. Part III maps these entryways before explaining how 
intergovernmental law enforcement tactics, which blend criminal and civil 
immigration law into what scholars have recently begun to describe as 
“crimmigration” law, create large-scale incarceration.
21
 
Part IV explains why immigration imprisonment became a central feature 
of civil and criminal immigration law enforcement. It did so, this Part contends, 
because immigration has become overrun by the rhetoric of criminality. 
Specifically, beginning in the 1980s, immigration came to be viewed as a 
security threat that needed to be managed alongside other dangers. 
Grounded in the rhetoric of criminality, Part V explains how immigration 
imprisonment has become deeply entrenched in immigration policy making 
and enforcement. Legislators and officials have become so tied to earlier 
decisions to use imprisonment that they rely on it by default, even in the face of 
reasonable alternatives. In turn, reliance on imprisonment has fueled a host of 
third parties who have staked their economic well-being on this law-
enforcement policy choice, and who have every reason to pressure government 
officials to maintain and expand immigration imprisonment. 
Difficult as it is to see an alternative to the growing push to imprison more 
migrants because of immigration activity, Part VI posits an alternative 
paradigm rooted in immigration law’s past reluctance to rely on confinement 
and inspired by a recent contraction of the criminal prison population. Just as 
immigration imprisonment expanded, Part VI suggests that it can shrink if 
policy makers so choose. 
I. 
HARMS OF IMMIGRATION IMPRISONMENT 
Immigration imprisonment is often considered a mere corollary to 
removal. However, in reality, it is so coercive, widespread, and racially skewed 
that it causes numerous independent harms—not only to migrants, but also to 
communities, and to the legitimacy of the immigration law system itself. These 
 
 21. Legal scholar Juliet Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration” in a 2006 article. Juliet 
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 
(2006). Analysis of this area of law has expanded quite rapidly since then. See, e.g., Jennifer M. 
Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009), 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/135_Chacon.pdf; Ingrid V. Eagly, 
Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1126 (2013); García Hernández, supra note 19, at 1457; Yolanda Vazquez, Advising Noncitizen 
Defendants on the Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the 
Criminal Defense Lawyer, the Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 31 
(2010). For the first book-length collection of scholarly essays explicitly addressing crimmigration, see 
SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN THE AGE OF FEAR (Maria João Guia et al. eds., 
2013). 
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effects arise regardless of whether imprisonment stems from civil- or criminal- 
law powers, or from federal, state, or local law enforcement initiatives. 
A. Policy Failures 
Measuring a law enforcement policy’s performance is never 
straightforward.
22
 While many factors play a role in how an imprisonment 
regime fares, two stand out as particularly salient to immigration 
imprisonment: effectiveness and efficiency.
23
 First, we must consider whether 
confinement achieves the goals of the respective substantive legal regime. 
Second, to the extent imprisonment meets these goals, we must address 
whether alternative policies could reach a substantially similar result at a lower 
financial and social cost. A clear-eyed assessment indicates that the costs of 
immigration imprisonment far outweigh its benefits. This is true for three 
reasons: (1) detention is overbroad; (2) it results in immense damage to migrant 
communities; and (3) it imposes significant financial costs on the federal 
government, even in the face of dramatically less expensive and more effective 
alternatives. 
Civil and criminal law authorize immigration imprisonment to promote a 
limited number of goals. First, in the civil context, unless a migrant is subject 
to mandatory detention, the migrant can only be confined while removal 
proceedings are pending if the migrant is either a flight risk or a danger to the 
community.
24
 The INA’s mandatory detention provision, section 236(c), 
suggests that, in Congress’s view, everyone who has committed one of the 
many crimes that lead to mandatory detention presents a risk of absconding or 
endangering the public.
25
 Thus, if an immigration judge orders a migrant 
removed from the United States, civil immigration detention is allowed to 
ensure that the government can locate the migrant when space on an outgoing 
bus or airplane becomes available. Second, in the penal context, confinement 
 
 22. See, e.g., ARJEN BOIN, CRAFTING PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS: LEADERSHIP IN TWO PRISON 
SYSTEMS 196 (2001) (“Measuring the performance of criminal justice systems is, for an abundance of 
reasons, a problematic affair.”); MARK H. MOORE & ANTHONY BRAGA, POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH 
FORUM, THE “BOTTOM LINE” OF POLICING 9 (2003) (acknowledging the difficulty of measuring the 
value of policing); BEN A. VOLLAARD, POLICE EFFECTIVENESS: MEASUREMENT AND INCENTIVES 1 
(2006) (lamenting an “absence of good indicators of police performance”). 
 23. See BOIN, supra note 23, at 197 tbl.7.1 (listing several standards by which to evaluate 
prison systems, including efficiency); John E. Eck & Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The New Police Order: 
Effectiveness, Equity, and Efficiency in Community Policing, in THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNITY 
POLICING: TESTING THE PROMISES 3, 5 (Dennis P. Rosenbaum ed., 1994) (positing that the public 
asks for three things from the police: effective, equitable, and efficient law enforcement). This Part 
discusses effectiveness and efficiency, while Part I.B discusses equity. 
 24. See Ellis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 641, 642 (B.I.A. 1993) (citing Patel, 15 I. & N. Dec. 666 (B.I.A. 
1976)). 
 25. INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518–20 
(2003) (explaining that Congress adopted section 236(c) “against a backdrop of wholesale failure by 
the INS to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens” who posed a public safety threat by 
committing more crimes and frequently absconding when released from civil immigration detention). 
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pending federal criminal proceedings (regardless of the offense) is allowed if 
the defendant is deemed at risk of absconding or endangering the public.
26
 
Upon conviction, U.S. courts permit incarceration as a means to punish the 
defendant and deter future violations.
27
 Convicted migrants are then subject to 
the very real possibility of forcible removal from the United States. 
Immigration imprisonment largely fails to accomplish these goals. To 
begin, many civil detainees present little if any risk of absconding or 
endangering the community if released.
28
 A substantial portion have spent 
many years in the United States, during which time they have developed deep 
ties to the community, while others are coming or returning to join family 
members.
29
 The more involved a person is with her community, the less likely 
she is to abscond.
30
 Furthermore, the vast majority of detainees (89 percent in 
2009) have never been convicted of a violent offense.
31
 There is no reason to 
believe that a person who has not engaged in violent crime in the past will do 
so in the future. Moreover, the INA’s mandatory detention provision does not 
even pretend to consider an individual’s dangerousness or likelihood of 
absconding. Congress, the Supreme Court has explained, may subject migrants 
to civil immigration detention merely for having been involved in criminal 
activity in the past (or for possessing any other characteristics that Congress 
deems worthy of detention).
32
 Congress has done just this through INA section 
236(c). 
This rationale applies to criminal pretrial detainees as well. Migrants are 
no less likely to have family members in the United States because they have 
been apprehended and prosecuted through the criminal immigration law 
enforcement system than through the civil system controlled by DHS. 
Furthermore, individuals with family members in the United States are more 
 
 26. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (2012); see also John Clark & D. Alan Henry, The Pretrial 
Release Decision, 81 JUDICATURE 76, 77 n.4 (1997) (noting that danger to the community became a 
standard feature of criminal pretrial detention processes beginning in 1970 in Washington, D.C.). 
 27. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896). 
 28. See Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, supra note 19, at 48. 
 29. See CITY BAR JUSTICE CTR., NYC KNOW YOUR RIGHTS PROJECT: AN INNOVATIVE PRO 
BONO RESPONSE TO THE LACK OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT IMMIGRANT DETAINEES 8 (2009) (noting 
that 85 percent of detainees interviewed at the Varick Federal Detention Center in New York City had 
been in the United States for more than five years); How Often is the Aggravated Felony Statute 
Used?, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports 
/158 (last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (explaining that people placed in removal proceedings on the basis of 
an alleged aggravated felony conviction have been in the United States for fifteen years on average). 
 30. See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, FAIR TREATMENT FOR THE INDIGENT: THE 
MANHATTAN BAIL PROJECT: TEN-YEAR REPORT, 1961–1971 (1972), as reprinted in MARK L. 
MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 98–104 
(4th ed. 2011); MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., A DECADE OF BAIL 
RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2012) (“The Manhattan Bail Project showed that defendants with 
strong ties to the community would usually return to court without bail . . . .”). 
 31. SCHRIRO, supra note 5, at 6. 
 32. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 524–25 (2003). 
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likely to return after removal,
33
 suggesting that many migrants have a strong 
desire to remain in locations where they are well-known and easily identifiable. 
Even those individuals incarcerated for immigration crimes are not 
especially worthwhile candidates for detention. Neither illegal entry nor illegal 
reentry, the two most commonly prosecuted immigration crimes, represents a 
threat to the public.
34
 Nor does punishment for engaging in this conduct appear 
to have a deterrent effect.
35
 Counterintuitively, empirical data suggest that 
harsher immigration law enforcement measures do little to stop people from 
coming to the United States and “may even have increased the likelihood of 
continuing undocumented migration among experienced migrants.”
36
 This is 
not surprising, given that many unauthorized migrants venture to the United 
States to unite with family, to search for opportunities they cannot find in their 
home country, or to escape violence. 
In addition, immigration imprisonment fails to promote the goals of 
immigration law when it captures people who are undeniably outside its reach: 
U.S. citizens.
37
 Though it is difficult to know precisely how many U.S. citizens 
have been incarcerated due to suspicion of violating an immigration law 
provision, what little empirical research has been done, supported by anecdotal 
information gleaned from judicial decisions, indicates that this is not an 
isolated occurrence.
38
 Luis Fernando Juárez, for example, received concurrent 
sentences of thirty-six and forty-two months on two immigration crimes—
illegal reentry and lying about being a U.S. citizen on an application to 
purchase a firearm—to which it was later discovered he had an absolute 
defense: he is a U.S. citizen.
39
 James Azia Makowski, who was born in India 
and became a United States citizen as a one-year-old, was convicted of a low-
 
 33. MARK GRIMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR BORDER SEC. & IMMIGRATION, REASONS AND 
RESOLVE TO CROSS THE LINE: A POST-APPREHENSION SURVEY OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS 
ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 2 tbl.1 (2013) (reporting that migrants previously removed who 
had family members of any type in the United States were two to three times more likely than those 
without family members to attempt to return); see also Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes & Cynthia Bansak, 
U.S. Border Control: Counterpoint, in DEBATES ON U.S. IMMIGRATION 153, 159 (Judith Gans et al. 
eds., 2012) (suggesting family ties increase migrants’ will to cross the border). 
 34. See INA §§ 275–276, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325–1326 (2012). 
 35. See Emily Ryo, Deciding To Cross: Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migration, 78 
AM. SOC. REV. 574, 587 (2013). 
 36. Douglas S. Massey, How Arizona Became Ground Zero in the War on Immigrants, in 
STRANGE NEIGHBORS: THE ROLE OF STATES IN IMMIGRATION POLICY 40, 52 (Carissa Byrne Hessick 
& Gabriel J. Chin eds., 2014); see also Douglas S. Massey & Fernando Riosmena, Undocumented 
Migration From Latin America in an Era of Rising U.S. Enforcement, 630 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 294, 317 (2010). 
 37. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 56, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/PDFs/OIG_APP_FY13.pdf. 
 38. See, e.g., Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. 
Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 608 (2011) (claiming that as many as “4,000 U.S. 
citizens were detained or deported” in 2010, and more than 20,000 from 2003 to 2010). 
 39. United States v. Juarez, 672 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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level federal drug offense and sentenced to a seven-year prison term.
40
 Instead 
of going to a boot camp, he was sent to a maximum-security federal prison 
because DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) unit thought he 
was not a U.S. citizen, and lack of citizenship would have made him ineligible 
for the boot camp.
41
 Examples, such as these, of U.S. citizens caught up in the 
immigration imprisonment network abound. Indeed, data obtained from ICE 
indicate that the Agency issued an immigration detainer—a request that a 
person detained by a law enforcement agency remain in detention for as many 
as five days to allow ICE time to decide whether to take custody—on at least 
834 U.S. citizens from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012.
42
 It is not clear how 
many of these were actually taken into ICE custody, but, like Makowski, 
undoubtedly some were. 
Apart from the impact of a migrant’s forcible removal, immigration 
imprisonment also disrupts countless communities. Migrants frequently 
participate in all manner of community affairs, from working, to political 
organizing, to attending religious services.
43
 Detention necessarily removes 
them from these activities.
44
 Detention also makes obtaining representation 
much more difficult. Since immigration law is simply too complicated for most 
migrants to adequately represent themselves in court, representation has a 
strong positive correlation with a migrant’s likelihood of avoiding removal.
45
 
Relatedly, a study of cases in San Francisco Immigration Court found that 





 40. Makowski v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 3d 901, 907–08 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 41. Id. at 908. At sentencing, Makowski believed that he would be sent to a boot camp for 120 
days in lieu of serving the seven-year term of imprisonment. Id. ICE believed he was not a U.S. citizen 
because neither it nor its predecessor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, had updated 
Makowski’s file in the more-than-two-decades since he had become a United States citizen. Id. 
 42. ICE Detainers Placed on U.S. Citizens and Legal Permanent Residents, TRANSACTIONAL 
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 20, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/311. 
 43. See ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAULT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 
66 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that migrants participate in the labor force at roughly the national average, 
though migrants from Latin America, Africa, and Asia participate at higher rates); id. at 139 
(describing migrant participation in political activity); Frank Van Tubergen, Religious Affiliation and 
Attendance Among Immigrants in Eight Western Countries: Individual and Contextual Effects, 45 J. 
FOR SCI. STUD. RELIGION 1, 11 tbl.5 (2006) (finding that 35 percent of immigrants to the United States 
reported attending religious services at least once per week). 
 44. See TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES 
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 74 (2007) (contending that confinement “disrupts social 
networks and diminishes community stability”). 
 45. See Representation Is Key in Immigration Proceedings Involving Women with Children, 
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 18, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration 
/reports/377. 
 46. See N. CAL. COLLABORATIVE FOR IMMIGRANT JUSTICE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR 
IMMIGRANT FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES: STUDY OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DETAINED 
IMMIGRANTS IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 18 (2014). 
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More perniciously, detention severely impacts migrants’ families. In 
2009, almost seventeen million children had at least one parent who was not a 
U.S. citizen, and roughly 5.1 million children, including four million U.S. 
citizens, had at least one parent who lacked authorization to be in the United 
States.
47
 It is not clear how many children living in the United States have had 
a parent detained,
48
 but the DHS Inspector General found that 108,434 parents 
of U.S.-citizen children were deported between fiscal years 1998 and 2007.
49
 
Presumably, most of these parents saw the inside of an immigration prison at 
some point. In some instances, parents suffering domestic violence have been 
detained, leaving their children with an abusive partner.
50
 All of these effects 
are felt even if a migrant ultimately avoids removal, an outcome that is 
increasingly tenable for migrants with strong ties to the United States, as DHS 
has taken steps to deprioritize detention and removal of such individuals.
51
 
Detention sometimes plays an even more disruptive role in family life 
when a single parent or both parents are confined. According to one advocacy 
group, in 2011, at least 5,100 children lived in foster care because their parents 
had been detained or deported.
52
 A child’s placement in foster care presents its 
own challenge when parents are detained. To be reunited with a child, a parent 
usually must comply with a reunification plan.
53
 These plans often include 
requirements, such as regular phone calls and contact visits that detention 
makes impossible, or at best very difficult.
54
 Many parents, therefore, lose 
 
 47. See Jeanne Batalova & Aaron Terrazas, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants 
and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.migration 
policy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states. 
 48. Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration Enforcement and the Child Welfare 
System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 114 (2011) (explaining that much of the reason for the lack of 
information about the number of children with detained parents arises from the fact that “[t]he child 
welfare system does not systematically collect this information,” and noting that “ICE does not release 
information about the number of parents who are detained”). 
 49. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-09-15, REMOVALS 
INVOLVING ILLEGAL ALIEN PARENTS OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN CHILDREN 5 (2009). 
 50. KAVITHA SREEHARSHA, REFORMING AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION LAWS: A WOMAN’S 
STRUGGLE 11 (2010). 
 51. Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to 
Field Office Dirs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration 
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 4–5 
(June 17, 2011) [hereinafter June 17 Morton Memo], http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (listing a large number of factors that ICE weighs 
in favor of exercising its prosecutorial discretion regarding removal proceedings). 
 52. APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 22 (2011). 
 53. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, TORN APART BY IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: 
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND IMMIGRATION DETENTION 2 (2010). 
 54. Id. at 2; Anita Ortiz Maddali, The Immigrant “Other”: Racialized Identity and the 
Devaluation of Immigrant Family Relations, 89 IND. L.J. 643, 690 (2014). In 2013, DHS adopted a 
policy intended to ameliorate the impact that immigration law enforcement, including detention, has 
on parental custody rights. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
DIRECTIVE 11064.1, FACILITATING PARENTAL INTERESTS IN THE COURSE OF CIVIL IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/parental 
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custody of their children after being imprisoned.
55
 As with migrants with strong 
ties to the United States, ICE favorably considers that a migrant has or will 




In addition to detrimental social effects, immigration imprisonment 
imposes a significant financial cost on government entities. Congress allocated 
$2.8 billion to civil immigration detention and removal operations in the fiscal 
year 2014 budget alone.
57
 In fiscal year 2015, USMS requested $1.5 billion to 
house, transport, and care for pretrial federal detainees, almost half of whom it 
expects will be detained because of an immigration charge.
58
 For its part, the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) requested $6.9 billion for salaries and 
expenses associated with inmate care and confinement.
59
 In recent years, 




While these dollar amounts are impressive by themselves, a better 
measure of their value comes only by considering the threat the people 
incarcerated pose and the ability to regulate that risk through alternative means. 
The vast majority of detained migrants are unlikely to endanger the public if 
released. At most, roughly 11 percent of detainees in civil immigration 
detention can be said to be dangerous.
61
 Nothing about the commission of the 
leading federal immigration crimes—illegal entry and illegal reentry—suggests 
dangerousness, since these crimes consist of traveling to the United States 
without the government’s permission.
62
 Despite their nonviolent nature, both 
carry potentially substantial sentences: up to two years imprisonment for a 





_interest_directive_signed.pdf. Among other requirements, the policy instructs ICE to “arrange for the 
detained alien parent or legal guardian’s in-person appearance at family court or child welfare 
proceedings, if practicable.” Id. § 5.4. 
 55. See, e.g., Adoption of C.M. v. E.M.B.R., 414 S.W.3d 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (recounting 
one migrant’s termination of parental rights after an arrest in an immigration raid at her workplace). 
 56. June 17 Morton Memo, supra note 51, at 4–5. 
 57. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. II, 128 Stat. 5, 
251. 
 58. U.S. MARSHALS SERV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2015 PERFORMANCE BUDGET: 
PRESIDENT’S BUDGET SUBMISSION: FEDERAL PRISONER DETENTION APPROPRIATION 7–9 (2014) 
[hereinafter USMS, FY 2015 BUDGET]. 
 59. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2015 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE 
4 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2015summary/pdf/bop.pdf. 
 60. See CARSON & GOLINELLI, supra note 8, at 43 app. tbl.11. 
 61. See SCHRIRO, supra note 5, at 2. 
 62. See INA §§ 275(a), 276(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a), 1326(a) (2012). For a summary of other 
federal immigration crimes, see García Hernández, supra note 19, at 1471–72. 
 63. INA §§ 275(a), 276(b)(2). 
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Moreover, government agencies have plenty of other tools at their 
disposal to limit the risk of migrants absconding.
64
 Penal and civil immigration 
law enforcement authorities regularly release detainees from confinement, 
sometimes under supervised release conditions and at other times without 
imposing even that level of oversight.
65
 Though no studies track the appearance 
rates of people released from pretrial penal confinement while awaiting 
prosecution for an immigration crime, several studies indicate that appearance 
rates are quite high for participants in alternatives to civil immigration 
detention. ICE reported a 93.8 percent appearance rate for its alternative to 
detention (ATD) programs in fiscal year 2010.
66
 This exceeds the greater-than-
80-percent court appearance rate achieved by an intensive pilot program that 
the Vera Institute of Justice operated in the late 1990s at the request of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
67
 
In addition to increased appearance rates, ATD programs have the added 
benefit of operating at a fraction of the cost of detention. ICE reports that each 
detention bed costs $119 per day, but the Government Accountability Office 
reports that the true figure is $158, including personnel costs.
68
 Meanwhile, 
ICE currently funds one ATD program called the Intensive Supervision 
Assistance Program (ISAP) II, operated by a subsidiary of the private prison 
corporation GEO Group.
69
 It has a capacity of approximately 22,000 people per 
day.
70
 In fiscal year 2013, ISAP II cost ICE as little as $0.30 per day for 
technological supervision and as much as $8.49 per day for more intensive in-
person supervision. Its cost per participant averaged $4.73 per day.
71
 Despite 
the success of ATD programs, however, the federal government continues to 
 
 64. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)–(c) (2012) (describing alternatives to federal pretrial 
criminal detention); Sampson & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 105 (discussing the alternatives to civil 
immigration detention used in multiple countries). 
 65. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Salaries 
and Expenses, collected in CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FY 2015, at 62 (2014) 
[hereinafter ICE FY 2015 Budget Justification], http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications 
/DHS-Congressional-Budget-Justification-FY2015.pdf (describing the release options available for 
people in civil immigration proceedings). 
 66. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Salaries 
and Expenses, collected in CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FY 2012, at 44 (2011) 
[hereinafter ICE FY 2012 Budget Justification], http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-congressional-
budget-justification-fy2012.pdf. 
 67. MEGAN GOLDEN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE APPEARANCE ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM: ATTAINING COMPLIANCE WITH IMMIGRATION LAWS THROUGH COMMUNITY 
SUPERVISION 14–15 (1998). 
 68. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 15-26, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION: 
IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSES NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS PROGRAM 
EFFECTIVENESS 19 n.47 (2014); ICE FY 2015 Budget Justification, supra note 65, at 40. 
 69. ICE FY 2012 Budget Justification, supra note 66, at 44; see also LUTHERAN 
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE SERV., ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION (ATD): HISTORY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2013), http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/LIRS-Backgrounder-on-
Alternatives-to-Detention-12-6-13.pdf. 
 70. ICE FY 2015 Budget Justification, supra note 65, at 60. 
 71. Id. at 62. 
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emphasize detention. President Barack Obama’s fiscal year 2015 budget 
request, for example, asked for $2.6 billion for all detention and removal 




Such an emphasis on detention is neither surprising nor wise. Applying 
“the minimum degree of control sufficient to ensure security,” argues 
sociologist Charles H. Logan, promotes “[t]he causes of justice, order, 
economy, and inmate welfare.”
73
 A proponent of private prisons, Logan 
nonetheless bemoans that prison officials often use more stringent security 
measures than needed for no better reason than because those resources are 
available and because over-securitization “decreases political costs by 
minimizing the risk of escapes or loss of control.”
74
 
With such high appearance rates and low costs compared to detention, the 
federal government’s continued primary reliance on detention is unjustifiable. 
Add to this the harsh impact that immigration imprisonment metes out on 
communities, families, and individuals needlessly detained—sometimes 
unlawfully, as in the case of U.S. citizens—and the result is clear: immigration 
imprisonment is a harsh, expensive tactic used excessively in the face of less 
severe, less expensive, and more effective alternatives. 
B. Law Suffers 
Aside from being poor policy, immigration imprisonment also threatens 
the legitimacy of the immigration law system as a whole. Legitimacy depends 
on the fairness of the procedures used to enforce the law.
75
 People obey the law 
when they perceive the authority that enforces it as legitimate and when 
compliance comports with their sense of morality.
76
 Morality plays an 
important role in compliance
77
—people are less likely to obey a law that they 
view as morally illegitimate.
78
 Heavy-handed use of immigration imprisonment 
affects how migrants and their communities view the procedural fairness and 
morality of immigration law enforcement. This, in turn, undermines the 
legitimacy of the system. 
Furthermore, immigration imprisonment falls most heavily on people of 
color, especially migrants from Mexico and other Latin American countries. In 
 
 72. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Total Budget Authority, in ICE FY 2015 Budget 
Justification, supra note 65, at 5. 
 73. CHARLES. H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 71 (1990). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 63 (Princeton U. Press 2006) (1990). 
 76. See id. at 25. Other reasons why people obey laws include an individual’s cost-benefit 
analysis of compliance and opportunity structures for noncompliance. See Emily Ryo, Through the 
Back Door: Applying Theories of Legal Compliance to Illegal Immigration During the Chinese 
Exclusion Era, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 109, 113–14 (2006).  
 77. See Ryo, supra note 76, at 127. 
 78. See id. 
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fiscal year 2012, for example, at least 92.7 percent of civil immigration 
detainees emigrated from Latin America, including 64.4 percent from Mexico 
alone.
79
 Though comparable figures for the penal immigration population are 
unavailable, the federal government reported that, of the 47,551 federal 
prisoners in fiscal year 2010 who were not U.S. citizens, 33,600 were Mexican 




Such racially skewed enforcement may lead to the perception that 
immigration law enforcement targets people of color generally and Latinos 
specifically. This can lead to a delegitimation of immigration law enforcement 
in the eyes of Latino migrants, their friends, and their families.
81
 Law 
enforcement processes perceived as racially skewed threaten to delegitimize 
immigration law. If migrants come to think that legal proceedings are stacked 
against them, they are less likely to abide by the rules of the proceedings.
82
 
This is an obviously undesirable outcome. 
Moreover, immigration imprisonment’s broad reach means that many 
people may view it as indiscriminate. Given that only a small percentage of 
people incarcerated for immigration law violations have committed a violent 
act,
83
 sympathetic commentators frequently claim that migrants have done 
nothing worthy of detention. Indeed, a common refrain among immigrants’ 
rights advocates is that migrants are not criminals and thus should not be 
treated as such.
84
 Former Florida Governor Jeb Bush illustrated a variation of 
this framing recently, commenting that unauthorized migrants “crossed the 
border because they had no other means to work to be able to provide for their 
 
 79. See SIMANSKI & SAPP, supra note 10, at 5 tbl.5. DHS enumerates specific detention data 
for the ten most common countries of origin only. Id. Together, citizens of these countries comprise 
93.6 percent of the fiscal year 2012 detained population. Of these, all but Jamaica (0.5 percent of the 
total detained population) and China (0.4 percent of the total detained population) are in Latin 
America. See id. 
 80. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239913, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
2010, at 24 tbl.14 (2013). 
 81. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS 38 (2004); Ryo, supra note 35, at 593. 
 82. See Das, supra note 19, at 154 (“People who are eligible for relief from removal have a 
stronger incentive to appear in immigration court to resolve their cases.”). 
 83. See SCHRIRO, supra note 5, at 2. 
 84. See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration Reform and 
Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101, 104 (2013) (“When citizenship is assessed with an ever-narrowing view 
of worthiness, many are left outside its frame.”); Jodie M. Lawston & Ruben R. Murillo, Policing Our 
Border, Policing Our Nation: An Examination of the Ideological Connections Between Border 
Vigilantism and U.S. National Ideology, in BEYOND WALLS AND CAGES: PRISONS, BORDERS, AND 
GLOBAL CRISIS 181, 183 (Jenna M. Loyd et al. eds., 2012) (noting the discursive criminalization of 
immigrants, since “immigration law falls under administrative law, not criminal law”). To be sure, 
some advocates—especially those among the more radical leftists—reject the discourse of criminality 
entirely. See Borderlands Autonomist Collective, Resisting the Security-Industrial Complex: 
Operation Streamline and the Militarization of the Arizona-Mexico Borderlands, in BEYOND WALLS 
AND CAGES, supra, at 193. 
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family—yes, they broke the law, but it’s not a felony . . . —it’s an act of 
love.”
85
 A law enforcement regime that is perceived as punishing good-hearted 




Finally, detention adversely affects rule-of-law norms. Since detention 
severely impacts a migrant’s ability to access counsel, it is impossible to know 
whether pro se migrants are removed because the law mandated that outcome 
or simply because no one was available to make the migrant’s case. Detention, 
therefore, indirectly diminishes the legitimacy of the outcome. 
II. 
IMMIGRATION PRISONERS 
Despite the harms outlined above, immigration imprisonment is 
ubiquitous. Federal, state, and local government actors annually identify and 
detain more than five hundred thousand people allegedly involved in prohibited 
migration activity. These are the nation’s immigration prisoners—those most 
directly affected by the harms of imprisonment and the widespread use of 
incarceration to enforce immigration law. Though they may be confined by 
various actors—be they federal, state, or local authorities—the commonality 
among their experiences counsels for treating this as a single phenomenon. All 
of these individuals are incarcerated because of migration-related activity. They 
would not be detained but for the act of crossing the border or various actions 
necessary to survive. It is that activity that makes them susceptible to this type 
of confinement. In addition, while some immigration imprisonment is labeled 
civil and some criminal, the conditions of confinement in secure facilities are 
essentially identical. This Part identifies the immigration-related conduct that 
federal and state legislatures have deemed worthy of confinement, and explains 
how often confinement happens. 
A. Federal Civil Immigration Prisoners 
It is no surprise that the federal government regulates immigration 
through what we think of as our “immigration laws,” that is, the set of laws that 
determine who may be in the country. Yet, it is much less commonly 
understood that this civil system, in which no person is ever accused or 
convicted of a crime, also results in a vast network of immigration 
imprisonment. In reality, the federal government uses its extraordinary 
administrative powers to regulate migrants’ conduct by confining them. Indeed, 
 
 85. Peter Moskowitz, Jeb Bush Calls Illegal Immigration ‘An Act of Love,’ Riles 
Conservatives, AL JAZEERA AM. (Apr. 6, 2014, 5:12 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles 
/2014/4/6/jeb-bush-calls-crossingtheborderanactofloverilesconservatives.html. 
 86. Cf. Ryo, supra note 35, at 594. 
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CIVIL IMMIGRATION DETENTION POPULATION 
At the root of civil immigration detention is a single statutory provision, 
INA section 236, which provides two means through which DHS may detain 
migrants. One path obligates DHS to detain individuals who meet specified 
criteria, while the other provides a discretionary route. 
Under INA section 236(c), DHS “shall take into custody” all migrants 
whom immigration officials have “reason to believe” are inadmissible or 
deportable on the bases enumerated in the statute, including almost all of the 
crime-based removal categories.
88
 An individual convicted of a qualifying 
crime—ranging from offenses as minor as shoplifting to crimes as serious as 
murder—must be taken into DHS custody. That individual must be kept and 
remain in custody pending resolution of the immigration court process, until an 




 87. I have selected these dates to provide a consistent comparison to the post-conviction data 
reported in Figure 2. Data for other years are available and similarly show a growing population. 
 88. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 660, 662, 668 (B.I.A. 1999); see also INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1226(c) (2012); Diop v. ICE, 656 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 89. Shoplifting and murder are both aggravated felonies, thus both fall within INA § 236(c). 
See INA § 101(a)(43)(G) (defining a theft offense with a term of imprisonment of at least one year as 
an aggravated felony); id. § 101(a)(43)(A) (defining murder as an aggravated felony); id.  
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing that a migrant convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable); id.  
§ 236(c)(1)(B) (providing that a person reasonably believed to be deportable pursuant to  
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) is subject to mandatory custody). Whether or not a specific state statute punishing 
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This mandatory-detention provision covers persons whom ICE agents 
reasonably believe are removable for having been convicted of a controlled 
substance offense—a category that, as the Supreme Court has put it, includes 
“virtually every drug offense except for only the most insignificant marijuana 
offenses.”
90
 This category also includes anyone convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude and sentenced to at least one year in prison—qualifying crimes 
include animal fighting and indecent exposure.
91
 
Though the mandatory custody statute is quite broad, only a small 
percentage of migrants detained by DHS fall within its reach. According to a 
study analyzing immigration court and DHS data, “at least three out of every 
five individuals detained by ICE who are put into removal proceedings could 
have been released.”
92
 A second study found that, according to ICE’s own 
records, “only 9 [percent] of individuals are considered subject to mandatory 
detention.”
93
 Under both studies, the conclusion is unmistakable: while many 
detained people fall within the mandatory custody provision, the vast majority 
do not. 
As these numbers imply, migrants who are not caught in INA section 
236(c)’s wide net are nonetheless detainable. Front-line immigration agents 
have remarkable authority to detain or release on bond anyone potentially 
subject to removal, even if section 236(c) does not apply.
94
 One statutory 
section, for example, provides that “an alien may be arrested and detained 
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United 
States.”
95
 Another grants immigration officers broad warrantless arrest powers 
 
law purposes, however, depends on the language of the state offense and, for theft offenses, the 
sentence imposed. 
 90. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 n.1 (2010); INA § 236(c)(1)(B) (referencing INA 
section 237(a)(2)(B), which provides that a person convicted of a controlled substance offense, “other 
than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is 
deportable”). 
 91. INA § 236(c)(1)(C) (providing that a migrant reasonably believed to be deportable under 
INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least one year is subject to 
mandatory custody); id. § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) (stating that a migrant convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude is deportable). 
 92. Steering Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: 
The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 374 
(2011) (emphasis omitted). For an explanation of the study’s data and methodology, see id. at 408–09. 
 93. NYU SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC ET AL., INSECURE COMMUNITIES, 
DEVASTATED FAMILIES: NEW DATA ON IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND DEPORTATION PRACTICES 
IN NEW YORK CITY 10 (2012) [hereinafter INSECURE COMMUNITIES] (emphasis omitted). This report 
analyzed data obtained from ICE of all individuals apprehended by ICE’s New York City field office 
from October 2005 through December 2010. These individuals either received or requested a hearing 
but were not granted a hearing before an immigration judge. Id. at 1. Interestingly, this report and the 
New York Immigrant Representation Study Report differ dramatically from Schriro’s analysis of a 
narrower data set—the civil detainee population on September 1, 2009. SCHRIRO, supra note 5, at 6. 
Unlike these reports, Schriro found that “[o]f the aliens in detention on September 1, 66 percent were 
subject to mandatory detention.” Id. at 2. 
 94. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2015). 
 95. INA § 236(a). 
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if an officer has reason to believe that a person is in the United States in 
violation of immigration law “and is likely to escape before a warrant can be 
obtained.”
96
 Detained migrants can then seek “redetermination” of the front-
line officer’s decision to detain by petitioning an immigration judge for bond.
97
 
Unlike the mandatory custody provision’s specific directives, INA section 
236(a) grants immigration judges wide latitude to make discretionary 
determinations about which migrants to detain, pending removal proceedings. 
In deciding whether to grant a bond, immigration judges typically focus on 
whether a migrant is a flight risk or a danger to the community.
98
 If the 
immigration judge concludes that the migrant poses one of these threats, then 
continued detention is legally appropriate. Importantly, immigration judges 
“ha[ve] broad discretion in deciding the factors that [they] may consider” to 
determine whether a migrant is a flight or public safety risk.
99
 
For example, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has upheld an 
immigration judge’s denial of bond when the immigration judge relied on facts 
and charges in a criminal complaint to which the migrant had pleaded not 
guilty, which the criminal court had found to merit a bond from criminal 
incarceration, and which had not yet resulted in a conviction.
100
 Attorney 
General John Ashcroft upheld denial even when there was no indication that 
the detained migrant had been involved in criminal activity. In D-J-, the 
Attorney General found that it was permissible to detain an individual merely 
for arriving in the United States without authorization as part of a group of over 
two hundred Haitians on board an overloaded boat, some of whom had tried to 
evade the U.S. Coast Guard.
101
 
Ashcroft’s decision in D-J- marked an important departure from the 
traditional inquiry regarding flight risk and public safety threat. A migrant may 
be detained pending civil immigration proceedings, he announced, if she poses 
a national security risk or her confinement would deter others from coming to 
the United States. The latter was a particularly striking justification, since it is a 
frequent reason given to impose criminal imprisonment, but not one that 
appears in civil detention norms. For a decade after its 2003 announcement, 
immigration judges used D-J- infrequently. However, during the summer of 
2014, it played an important role in the federal government’s decision to detain 
children and mothers who began appearing in unusually large numbers. A 





 96. Id. § 287(a)(2). 
 97. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1). 
 98. See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 99. Id. at 40. 
 100. See id. at 38–39. 
 101. See D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 577–79 (Att’y Gen. 2003). 
 102. R.I.L-R v. Johnson, No. 15-11 (JEB), 2015 WL 737117 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2015). 
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Unlike the penal context, there is no presumption that a migrant in civil 
immigration proceedings will be released.
103
 Rather, the migrant carries the 
burden of showing that he is not likely to abscond and does not present a risk of 
endangering the community.
104
 Migrants have a difficult time meeting this 
burden because they do not have a right to appointed counsel. Consequently, 44 
percent of all migrants in removal proceedings, and an astonishing 84 percent 
of detained migrants in those proceedings, lack representation.
105
 Even those 
who do obtain counsel frequently do so well after an ICE official has decided 
they merit detention. Obtaining bond is therefore a steep hurdle for migrants to 
overcome. 
If the immigration judge concludes that a migrant does not pose a flight or 
safety threat, then the immigration judge should grant a bond. Actual release, 
however, is not guaranteed. The INA requires that any bond issued be at least 
$1,500, and, unlike many criminal-law contexts, an immigration court bond 
must be paid in full. This is no small amount for migrants, especially given 
that, because of their incarceration, those who do receive bond have not had 
meaningful employment while detained. Even those who work inside the 




Moreover, when they do grant a bond, immigration judges frequently 
impose much higher amounts than the statutory minimum. A study of bond 
orders issued by New York immigration judges revealed that “[o]ver 75 
[percent] of all bond settings are $5,000 or more” and “35 [percent] of all 
bonds are $10,000 and above.”
107
 A migrant’s resources matter little in setting 
a bond amount. Indeed, an official guide for immigration judges advises that a 
migrant’s “[a]bility to pay is not dispositive” in setting a bond amount and is a 
“less significant factor” than whether the migrant has a fixed address, lawful 
immigration status in the United States, family ties, a criminal record, or other 
factors deemed “significant.”
108
 With such high bond amounts and such little 
consideration of a migrant’s financial resources, it is not surprising that the 
 
 103. See D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 575, 581. 
 104. Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40; see also D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 581. 
 105. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012: 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK G1 fig.9 (2013); NINA SIULC ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING 
EFFICIENCY AND PROMOTING JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 1 (2008). 
 106. See Varick Fed. Detention Facility, Detainee Handbook 10 (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://www.governmentillegals.org/2011FOIA13921SlaveLabor.pdf (unpublished internal facility 
document describing the “Detainee Volunteer Work Program”). Employment of detained migrants is 
authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1555 (2012). 
 107. INSECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 93, at 11. 
 108. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION JUDGE 
BENCHBOOK §§ I.H., I.I.2. (n.d.), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/Bond_Guide.pdf. 
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New York bond study found that “55 [percent] of those who receive bond are 
unable to pay it.”
109
 Those individuals consequently remain detained. 
B. Federal Criminal Immigration Prisoners 
In addition to its expansive civil immigration powers, the federal 
government readily uses its criminal policing authority to imprison large 
numbers of migrants. The USMS is the federal policing agency responsible for 
pretrial custody of individuals suspected of all types of federal crimes, and a 
large portion of those within its custody are suspected of having committed a 
federal crime related to immigration activity.
110
 These crimes include illegal 
entry, a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months imprisonment for a first 
offense, and illegal reentry into the United States, a felony punishable by as 
many as twenty years imprisonment.
111
 The USMS expects to book 105,164 
individuals for immigration crimes in fiscal year 2015 alone, just shy of half 
the 220,599 total people the Agency expects to take into custody that year, and 
almost double the 54,621 pretrial immigration detainees held in the 2007 fiscal 
year.
112
 Federal prosecutors in U.S. Attorneys’ Offices then prosecute the 
detained individuals. In fiscal year 2010, U.S. Attorneys concluded 85,545 
cases in which an immigration crime was the lead charge against the 
defendant.
113
 These cases made up a remarkable 44.6 percent of total cases 
concluded by federal prosecutors that year, up from 25.9 percent four years 
earlier.
114
 By fiscal year 2012, a remarkable 48 percent of all cases concluded 
were for immigration crimes.
115
 
Upon conviction, most of these individuals were ordered into the custody 
of the BOP, the federal agency charged with maintaining custody of federal 
prisoners convicted of crimes. Given the growing number of immigration crime 
prosecutions, it is not surprising that the number of convicted offenders 
imprisoned in the federal prison system also grew, though relatively short 
prison sentences mean that they represent a lesser portion of the total convicted 
offender prison population. The percentage of immigration crime offenders in 
BOP’s custody rose from 10 percent in 2002 to 12 percent in 2010.
116
 Figure 2 
 
 109. INSECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 93, at 11. Accounts of civil immigration detention in 
the 1980s suggest that migrants have long had difficulty meeting bond amounts. ROBERT S. KAHN, 
OTHER PEOPLE’S BLOOD: U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS IN THE REAGAN DECADE 72 (1996). 
 110. See MOTIVANS, supra note 6, at 3 tbl.2. 
 111. INA §§ 275(a), 276(a), (b)(2), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a), 1326(a), (b)(2) (2012). 
 112. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 230889, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.1.1 (2010); USMS, FY 2015 BUDGET, 
supra note 55, at 7, 8. 
 113. MOTIVANS, supra note 80, at 12 tbl.6. 
 114. See id.  
 115. MOTIVANS, supra note 6, at 12 tbl.6. 
 116. MOTIVANS, supra note 80, at 23 (stating that 12 percent of federal prisoners in 2010 
were immigration offenders); see id. at 22 tbl.13 (noting that 82.4 percent of people convicted of 
an immigration crime in FY 2010 and 91 percent convicted in 2006 were sentenced to prison); 
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POST-CONVICTION IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN FEDERAL PRISON 
 
 
C. State Immigration Prisoners 
Following the federal government’s model, some states—most notably 
Arizona—have also made frequent use of their criminal authority in ways that 
implicate immigration imprisonment. They have done this by creating 
substantive criminal laws and regulating criminal procedure. 
Arizona’s experiment with human smuggling illustrates states’ reliance on 
substantive criminal lawmaking authority. In 2005, that State’s legislature 
criminalized “intentionally engag[ing] in the smuggling of human beings for 
 
MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 238581, IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE 
FEDERAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2010, at 34 tbl.13 (2012, rev. 2013) (stating that there were 15,711 
immigration offenders in BOP custody in 2002); PAIGE M. HARRISON & JENNIFER C. KARBERG, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 198877, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2002, at 1 (stating 
there were 161,681 prisoners in BOP custody in 2002). 
 117. MOTIVANS, NCJ 238581, supra note 116 (stating that the number of post-conviction 
immigration offenders in federal custody was 15,711 in 2002 and 21,917 in 2010); JOHN SCALIA 
& MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 191745, IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 2000, at 5 (2002) (stating that the number of post-
conviction immigration offenders in federal prison was 1,593 in 1985 and 13,676 in 2000). 
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profit or commercial purpose.”
118
 Without question, the law was meant to 
sanction people who are paid to clandestinely bring migrants into Arizona. 
Even before this new anti-smuggling law went into effect, however, 
prosecutors in Maricopa County were creatively retooling it to target the 
migrants smuggled, as well.
119
 The Maricopa County Attorney and Sheriff each 
created units within their offices to target this brand of human smuggling that 
equated the people who pay to be snuck into the United States with those who 
are paid. Within a few months, “hundreds of migrants were arrested in 
Maricopa County for smuggling themselves.”
120
 
One early victory for this innovative self-smuggling strategy, for example, 
involved a man who had been riding under a piece of carpet in the bed of a 
pickup truck.
121
 Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office deputies chased the truck at 
speeds in excess of one hundred miles per hour after noticing that it had a 
malfunctioning brake light. Though the driver was never caught, this migrant 
was arrested and convicted of conspiring to smuggle himself.
122
 The law’s 
implementation criminalized certain behavior related to migration itself and, as 
such, resulted in the prosecution and conviction of migrants for offenses for 
which they were then subject to state incarceration. 
Separately, Arizona elected officials adopted a series of criminal-
procedure reforms targeted at keeping migrants charged with crimes in jail 
longer. First, the Arizona legislature enacted a statute requiring all state 
detention facilities to determine the citizenship status of all arrestees.
123
 At the 
same time, they mandated that state judges consider a person’s immigration 
status when deciding whether to grant bail.
124
 Second, voters amended the State 
Constitution to add a provision prohibiting judges from granting bail “[f]or 
serious felony offenses . . . if the person charged has entered or remained in the 
United States illegally.”
125
 The State legislature subsequently defined “serious 
felony offense” for these purposes to include most state felonies.
126
 While the 
underlying offenses in cases subject to these rules could be related to any type 
of crime, the salient feature of these detention measures is the identity and 
 
 118. Act of Mar. 14, 2005, sec. 3, 47 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. ch. 2 (codified as 
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2319 (2015)). 
 119. Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 1759 (2011). After legal challenges in state and federal courts spanning 
several years, a federal district court held that federal immigration law preempts section 13-2319. 
We Are Am. v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 297 F.R.D. 373, 392 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
 120. Eagly, supra note 119, at 1762. 
 121. See State v. Barragan-Sierra, 196 P.3d 879, 882–83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
 122. See id. 
 123. Eagly, supra note 119, at 1762 (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3906 (2010)). 
 124. Id. (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967(B)(11)). 
 125. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22(4). 
 126. Act of June 28, 2006, sec. 3, 47 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2d Reg. Sess. ch. 380 (codified as 
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3961(A)(b) (2015)). Arizona recognizes six classes of 
felonies, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-601(A), but only class 1 through class 4 felonies are 
included in the “serious felony offense” definition. Id. § 13-3961(A)(b). 
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immigration status of the criminal defendant, thus creating another form of 
immigration imprisonment. These defendants, because of their status, are likely 
to be detained when a similarly situated U.S. citizen defendant would not. 
In a doubly harsh interaction of these two sets of laws, because human 
smuggling, including self-smuggling, is a felony, “[u]ndocumented immigrants 
charged with smuggling themselves could now be detained without any 
possibility of bond.”
127
 After the Arizona Supreme Court ordered that 
defendants potentially subject to the no-bail provision receive a hearing with 
appointed counsel within twenty-four hours of their initial appearance in court, 
the state legislature gave courts up to seven days to schedule a no-bail 
hearing.
128
 Meanwhile, “Maricopa County made a policy decision that indigent 
counsel could not be appointed until arraignment. As a result, defendants could 
remain detained for up to two weeks before obtaining a full [no-bail] hearing 
with counsel present.”
129
 After these changes, few migrants charged with 
smuggling themselves into Arizona managed to get out of jail on bail.
130
 In this 
case, the combination of the migration-related criminal activity and the migrant 
identity of the defendant led to immigration imprisonment. 
Not content with its unprecedented self-smuggling prosecutions leading to 
nearly automatic detention and especially harsh bond requirements for migrants 
accused of any crime, Arizona adopted other substantive crimes and criminal 
procedure features intending to imprison unauthorized migrants. In 2005, the 
legislature criminalized aggravated identity theft, punishable by up to seven 
years imprisonment, and trafficking in identity documents, punishable by up to 
ten years imprisonment.
131
 Both of these punishments target use of identifying 
information not belonging to the accused regardless of whether the 
identification information was fictitious or belonged to a real person. Two 
years later, in 2007, the Arizona legislature authorized law enforcement 
agencies to detain for up to seven days any witness who, “because of the 
immigration status of the person,” may not be available to testify at a human 
smuggling trial as a result of having been removed.
132
 A year later, the 
legislature enacted a statute that allows judges to enhance a minimum or 
maximum sentence if the defendant is found beyond a reasonable doubt to be, 
 
 127. Eagly, supra note 119, at 1763. 
 128. See id. at 1764–65. 
 129. Id. at 1765. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Act of Apr. 25, 2005, sec. 3, 47 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. ch. 190 (codified 
as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2009, -2010). Aggravated identity theft is a class 3 
felony, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is seven years. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 13-702(d). Trafficking in identity documents is a class 2 felony, for which the maximum term of 
imprisonment is ten years. Id. 
 132. Act of May 4, 2007, sec. 1, § 13-4085(A), (E), 48 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. ch. 
178 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4085(A), (E)); see also Eagly, supra note 119, at 
1766. 
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or admits to being, in the United States without authorization.
133
 Again, these 
provisions either directly criminalize—and punish through imprisonment—
migration-related activity on the state level or, alternatively, create mechanisms 
that result in the detention of migrants as a consequence of their status or 
migration-related conduct. 
Arizona has undoubtedly taken the lead in states’ contemporary efforts to 
use their criminal law and procedure to expand immigration imprisonment. It 
has not, however, been alone. Oklahoma, for example, imposes a minimum of 
one year of imprisonment for transporting, concealing, harboring, or sheltering 
anyone known to be present in the United States in violation of immigration 
law, or for doing so in reckless disregard of the fact that the person is present in 







have similar statutes, both of which establish violations punishable by 
imprisonment. 
At least three other states—California, Oregon, and Wyoming— 
“criminalize[] the use of false proof of citizenship or permanent residence 
documents.”
137
 All three rely on imprisonment to sanction violations of these 
offenses, though they differ in severity quite dramatically. Wyoming punishes 
the intentional use of false documents to conceal citizenship or permanent 
resident status by as little as six months,
138
 while California requires at least 
five years imprisonment for doing much the same.
139
 Oregon imposes a 
maximum term of five years imprisonment for using someone else’s citizenship 
status or “alien identification number,” a unique number assigned to all 
migrants who seek lawful immigration status.
140
 Yet another state, Colorado, 
criminalizes human smuggling, but, unlike Arizona, appears not to apply this 
statute to the smuggled migrants.
141
 Lastly, Missouri has a statutory no-bail 
 
 133. Act of July 7, 2008, sec. 23, § 13-701(D)(21), 48 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2d Reg. Sess. ch. 
301 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(D)(21)) (referencing failure to comply with 
INA §§ 273, 274, 275, 276, 278, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1328 (2012)); see also 
Eagly, supra note 120, at 1766. 
 134. OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 21, § 466(A)–(B) (2015). 
 135. FLA. STAT. § 787.07 (2015) (classifying human smuggling as a third-degree felony); 
id. § 775.082(3)(e) (authorizing up to a five-year prison term); id. § 775.084(4)(a)(3) (authorizing 
as many as ten years imprisonment for habitual offenders). 
 136. MO. REV STAT.§ 577.675(1), (2) (2014) (imposing at least one year imprisonment in 
the version of the statute effective through December 31, 2016, and classifying the crime as a 
“Class D” felony, punishable by up to seven years imprisonment per MO. REV STAT.§ 558.011, in 
the version effective January 2, 2017). 
 137. Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1599 (2008). 
 138. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-615(a) (2015). 
 139. CAL. PENAL CODE § 114 (West 2015). 
 140. OR. REV. STAT. § 165.800(2), (4)(b)(D) (2013) (defining terms related to identity 
theft); id. § 161.605(3) (setting a maximum imprisonment sentence of five years for a Class C 
felony). 
 141. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-13-128 (2014); see also People v. Fuentes-Espinoza, No. 
08CA1231, 2013 WL 174439 (Colo. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2013) (upholding statute’s constitutionality 
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provision,
142
 and a Texas legislator recently proposed a bill that would prevent 
unauthorized migrants from participating in community supervision 
programs.
143
 Immigration imprisonment is thus a feature not only of federal but 
also of state criminal policing. 
D. Federal-State Crossover Prisoners 
In addition to federal and state reliance on their own lawmaking powers, 
for many years migrants were imprisoned in large numbers through an 
innovative type of intergovernmental cooperation. Until federal courts largely 
curtailed the practice due to concerns about its encroachment on the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause requirement, ICE made ready use of immigration 
detainers (sometimes referred to as “immigration holds”).
144
 A detainer is a 
request by ICE to a law enforcement agency holding a potentially removable 
migrant already in its custody to postpone releasing the migrant for up to forty-
eight hours after the criminal-law justification for the detention ends.
145
 In the 




Stemming from the INA’s instruction that immigration officials target 
migrants convicted of certain offenses for civil detention and removal,
147
 
detainers blend administrative and criminal confinement into immigration 
imprisonment. By design, detainers frequently extend immigration 
imprisonment. Migrants subject to a detainer are confined during the forty-
eight hour window that ICE requests.
148
 Sometimes judges view a detainer as a 
sign that the person will abscond if given the opportunity.
149
 As a result, judges 
 
against preemption challenge), cert. granted in part, No. 13SC128, 2014 WL 1190061 (Colo. 
Mar. 24, 2014). 
 142. MO. REV. STAT. § 544.470 (2014). 
 143. S.B. 174, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015). 
 144. See Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United 
States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 634, 676 (2013); see also Complaint at 1, Roy v. Cnty. of Los 
Angeles, No. CV-12-9012-RGK (FFMx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2012), http://legalactioncenter.org 
/sites/default/files/Roy v. County of Los Angeles--Complaint.pdf (noting that “immigration 
detainer” and “immigration hold” are often used interchangeably); Christopher N. Lasch, 
Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 173–74 (2008) (describing detainers as central to CAP). 
 145. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2015); see also Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
 146. Targeting of ICE Detainers Varies Widely by State and by Facility, TRANSACTIONAL 
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 11, 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/343. 
The report notes that it does not include data for February, April, or September 2013, during this 
twenty-two month period. Id. Fifty percent of migrants had a conviction of some type on their 
records, while the rest did not. Id. 
 147. See Lasch, Enforcing the Limits, supra note 144, at 183. 
 148. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (authorizing detention in the custody of jail or prison officials for 
up to forty-eight hours to allow DHS to take the arrestee into civil immigration detention). 
 149. See State v. Fajardo-Santos, 973 A.2d 933, 940 (N.J. 2009) (“[T]he lodging of a 
detainer marks a change in circumstances that can affect whether a defendant will fail to appear. 
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deny bail or set it at an amount too high for migrants with a detainer to meet.
150
 
At other times, arrestees subject to an immigration detainer remain imprisoned 
even when a court has granted bail.
151
 Maria Miranda-Olivares, for example, 
could not get out of jail because guards told her she would not be allowed to 
leave even if she posted the bond amount set by a judge.
152
 Similarly, officials 
at the Lehigh County Prison in Pennsylvania refused to release Ernesto Galarza 




Furthermore, at times, detainers work to exclude migrants from jail 
diversion programs, into which migrants would otherwise stand a good chance 
of admission.
154
 Diversion programs such as drug rehabilitation are frequently 
credited with reducing recidivism and prison costs.
155
 In a review of 
immigration detainers lodged against inmates at New York City’s Rikers Island 
jail, however, the New York City Bar Association noted that, instead of leaving 
jail to enter into a diversion program, “immigrants with detainers remain at 
Rikers until the criminal case is adjudicated in the traditional manner, which, if 
a sentence results or no bail is paid, may result in days or months of 
incarceration before transfer to an immigration facility.”
156
 
Any of these events effectively prolongs a migrant’s criminal 
incarceration. A study of four years of detention data from Travis County, 
Texas, which includes Austin, revealed that inmates subject to a detainer 
remained imprisoned prior to trial almost three times longer than those without 
a detainer—from sixty-five to seventy-six days for inmates with a detainer 
compared to twenty-two to twenty-six days for those without.
157
 With some 
 
Judges may therefore consider that development in deciding whether to modify bail.”). Though 
Fajardo-Santos is, to date, the only State supreme court decision to address a detainer’s impact on 
bail, advocates regularly claim that judges see detainers as an adverse factor in bail 
determinations. See, e.g., IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., REVISED 2012 ICE DETAINER 
GUIDANCE: WHO IT COVERS, WHO IT DOES NOT, AND THE PROBLEMS THAT REMAIN 6–7 
(2012), http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/detainer_guidance_plus_addendums.pdf. 
 150. See AARTI SHAHANI, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, NEW YORK CITY ENFORCEMENT OF 
IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 4 (2010) (noting that, of noncitizens held in 
New York City jails on criminal charges, 35.8 percent of those without a detainer were released 
on bail, while only 7 percent of those with a detainer were able to make bail). 
 151. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at 
*3–4 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); see also Complaint, Roy v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, supra note 144, at 
1, 2, 3 (alleging that the Los Angeles County jail regularly denies migrants release after the forty-
eight hour window expires and subjected 19,725 people to this practice in 2011 alone). 
 152. Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *4. 
 153. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 154. See COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS, N.Y.C. BAR, IMMIGRATION 
DETAINERS NEED NOT BAR ACCESS TO JAIL DIVERSION PROGRAMS 3 (2009). 
 155. See Marsha Weissman, Aspiring to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration in 
the Era of Mass Incarceration, 33 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 243–44 (2009). 
 156. COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS, N.Y.C. BAR, supra note 154. 
 157. ANDREA GUTTIN, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM: 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS 12 fig.5 (2010). 
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variation, this trend holds true for all but the most minor misdemeanor 
offenses.
158
 An analysis of detainees in New York came to a similar 
conclusion. It found that “noncitizens charged with drug crimes and with an 
ICE detainer spend [seventy-three] days longer in jail before being discharged, 




Until recently, detainers often prolonged detention because many law 
enforcement agencies believed that detainers were obligatory.
160
 In practice, 
this means that police departments and sheriff’s offices regularly extended 
confinement beyond a migrant’s criminal release date for no reason other than 
the ICE detainer.
161
 After previously taking the position that detainers were 
mandatory,
162
 federal officials are now clear that detainers are merely requests 
to keep the arrestee imprisoned. Indeed, the standard detainer form that ICE 
used for years explicitly noted, “IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain 
custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS, excluding 
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would 
have otherwise been released from your custody.”
163
 A few lines later, the form 
adds, “you are not authorized to hold the subject beyond these 48 
hours.”
164
 The only federal circuit to have addressed whether detainers are 
mandatory takes the position that they are not.
165
 
Immigration detainers suffered a heavy blow in 2014 when a federal court 
concluded that they violate the Fourth Amendment.
166
 To avoid civil liability 
for illegally detaining individuals, law enforcement agencies nationwide 
quickly changed their detainer practices by limiting the extent to which they 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. SHAHANI, supra note 150, at 3. 
 160. E.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 640 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting Lehigh County, 
Pennsylvania’s position that detainers are mandatory obligations on local law enforcement 
agencies); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at 
*5 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (recording county jail officials’ argument that they were required to 
maintain a woman in custody because ICE had issued a detainer against her); see also Lasch, 
Enforcing the Limits, supra note 144, at 174 (describing local law enforcement agencies’ 
willingness to comply with detainer requests). But see Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers, 
supra note 144, at 678 (describing budding opposition to detainers). 
 161. See, e.g., Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *5 (explaining that jail officials 
kept the arrestee, against whom ICE had lodged an immigration detainer, in jail for nineteen hours 
after she should have been released at the completion of her sentence). 
 162. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers, supra note 144, at 676. 
 163. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS FORM I-247 (12/12), IMMIGRATION DETAINER—
NOTICE OF ACTION (2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-
form.pdf. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Galarza, 745 F.3d at 642. 
 166. See Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *9–11. 
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abide by detainers or by prohibiting compliance entirely.
167
 A few months later, 
DHS itself announced a change to its detainer practice. Instead of issuing 
requests for detention, ICE now issues only “requests that state or local law 
enforcement notify ICE of a pending release during the time that person is 
otherwise in custody under state or local authority.”
168
 This likely cures any 
Fourth Amendment concern, but it does not alter the detainer’s utility in 
identifying individuals to imprison by pairing state and local police work with 
ICE investigative abilities. All it does is shift the inquiry forward in time. 
III. 
THE IMMIGRATION-IMPRISONMENT PIPELINE 
Immigration imprisonment clearly occupies a prominent role in 
contemporary immigration law enforcement policies and results in the 
confinement of upwards of half a million people annually. Under the current 
state of criminal and civil immigration law enforcement, imprisonment for 
allegedly violating laws regulating migration can result from a variety of 
policing initiatives. Some are unquestionably features of the criminal justice 
system, while others are unmistakably part of the federal government’s civil 
law enforcement regime. Still others are creatures of a different ilk, making 
their categorization into one of these two traditional areas of law rather 
difficult. Whether they are civil or criminal law enforcement tactics, or 
something more difficult to classify, they all share one key characteristic: 
formal boundaries are becoming increasingly less relevant as criminal tactics 
reflect civil norms and vice versa. Consequently, the pathways to immigration 
imprisonment emblematize the burgeoning crimmigration law enforcement 
regime. To understand the immigration-imprisonment pipeline, this Part 
undertakes the first systematic mapping of the many ways migrants are and 
have been incarcerated due to migration activity. 
A. Federal Civil Immigration Imprisonment 
The nation’s civil-immigration detainees are apprehended through the 
efforts of two principal units within DHS: Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), in particular its Border Patrol division, and ICE. Both Agencies are 
charged with identifying and apprehending potentially removable 
 
 167. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Recent Federal Court Decision Finding It Unlawful for a 
Sheriff’s Department to Honor ICE Detainer Requests (May 2, 2014), http://www.ilrc.org/files 
/documents/letter_to_counties_re_miranda-olivares.pdf. 
 168. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t et al., Secure 
Communities 2 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Memo], at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default 
/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf. 
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individuals.
169
 With more than forty thousand agents between the two 
Agencies,
170
 both have done so with immense frequency. Combined, they 
apprehended 662,483 individuals in fiscal year 2013.
171
 ICE places these 
individuals in custody when its Enforcement and Removal Operations division 
decides that continued detention is appropriate.
172
 
Initial detention at the time that immigration authorities charge a migrant 
as removable is not the only route to civil immigration detention. ICE also 
maintains a specialized law enforcement program whose mission is to identify, 
locate, and arrest migrants with an outstanding removal order, migrants who 
returned to the United States without authorization after having been removed, 
or migrants who have been convicted of a crime.
173
 This initiative, the National 
Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP), has 129 “fugitive operations teams” (an 
increase of twenty-five teams from recent years)
174
 and is supported by a 
“fugitive operations” support center.
175
 ICE claims that NFOP has 
“dramatically expand[ed]” its ability to “locate, arrest and remove” migrants 
who “ha[ve] failed to depart the United States based upon a final order of 
removal, deportation or exclusion; or who ha[ve] failed to report to [ICE] after 
receiving notice to do so.”
176
 The former ICE Director John Morton explained 
NFOP’s role in the Agency’s enforcement strategy: “[T]he sound 
administration of the nation’s immigration system depends on an efficient, fair, 
and meaningful removal process,” thus “final orders of removal should be 
enforced and . . . those who knowingly disobey or evade a final order of 
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/publications /ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf. 
 170. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FY 2015, supra note 65, at CBP-14, ICE-
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 174. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS 
REPORT R42057, INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL 
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GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-07-34, AN ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS TEAMS 1 (2007) 
[hereinafter FOT ASSESSMENT], http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_07-34_Mar07.pdf. 
 175. Fugitive Operations, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, http://www.ice.gov 
/fugitive-operations (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). 
 176. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: 
ICE FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM (2007), http://www.colliergov.net/Modules/Show 
Document.aspx?documentid=15660. 
 177. NFOP Memo, supra note 173, at 1. 
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Since 2003, when Congress first funded NFOP,
178
 the program has, with 
few exceptions, steadily resulted in more arrests year after year.
179
 NFOP 
agents search for suspects “at worksites, in residential areas, and at other 
locations.”
180
 In fiscal year 2003, for example, NFOP claimed 1,900 arrests.
181
 
The next year, NFOP operations resulted in 6,584 arrests.
182
 By fiscal year 
2013, however, NFOP officers made 31,222 arrests, including 23,504 migrants 
with a criminal record.
183
 Surely this impressive growth is at least in part 
attributable to the remarkable budget increases the program has seen since its 
launch in 2003 with a $9 million budget.
184
 “By FY 2010, its budget had grown 
to $230 million,” though that dropped to $132.9 million in fiscal year 2013.
185
 
Though NFOP teams are supposed to target migrants who pose a public 
safety risk,
186
 there is reason to doubt that actually occurs. From June 2004 to 
January 2006, the Agency required that only 75 percent of people apprehended 
by each NFOP team be migrants with a criminal history.
187
 Even if teams met 
this goal, a quarter of arrestees would have no criminal history. NFOP 
apprehension data analyzed by the department’s inspector general suggests that 
many teams did not meet this goal. From the 2003 to 2006 fiscal years, the 
inspector general found that NFOP teams reported apprehending 16,712 non-
criminals and 13,661 criminals.
188
 NFOP teams continue to capture non-
criminals. Only 9 percent of NFOP arrests in 2007, for example, involved 
fugitive migrants with criminal convictions.
189
 Similarly, according to ICE, 
fewer than half the people arrested by an NFOP team during the fourth quarter 
of the 2010 fiscal year had any criminal history.
190
 
Even considering only those migrants with a conviction, not all pose a 
public safety risk. DHS does not provide data about how many of the migrants 
apprehended through NFOP with a criminal history had been convicted of a 
violent crime. An independent review of 2007 NFOP arrest data, however, 
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indicated “aliens posing a threat to the community or with a violent criminal 
conviction represented just 2 percent of all [NFOP team] arrests.”
191
 
Whether arrested because of an outstanding removal order, entry into the 
United States without authorization, or a conviction, individuals taken into 
custody by an NFOP team spend time in immigration imprisonment. Those 
with an outstanding removal order are likely removed rather quickly without 
any additional immigration court process. Individuals who entered without 
authorization can be placed in removal or criminal proceedings at the federal 
government’s election, and those who have already been convicted are placed 
in removal proceedings where they are almost always subject to mandatory 
detention. 
Another program known as the “Criminal Alien Removal Initiative” 
(CARI) adds to the array of immigration-imprisonment entry points. Not much 
is known about CARI; indeed, its very existence appears to have been 
discovered accidentally by New Orleans immigrants’ rights advocates.
192
 Like 
NFOP, CARI appears to target migrants with a criminal record.
193
 Though 
advocates claim that CARI operations have resulted in detention of migrants 
without a criminal record, no systematic examination of the initiative has 
occurred, so it is impossible to verify these claims.
194
 At this time, it is equally 
impossible to determine how many people have been detained through CARI. 
The recent revelation of its existence at the very least indicates that the full 
extent of federal programs in this area is not publicly known. 
B. Federal Criminal Immigration Imprisonment 
To identify, apprehend, and confine tens of thousands of criminal 
immigration law offenders, the federal government relies on prosecutorial and 
judicial initiatives that single out migrants for expedited treatment in the 
criminal justice system. This allows the federal government to move more 
people through federal prisons. One prosecutorial innovation in particular, 
known as fast-track plea agreements, has significantly raised the stakes for 
migrants who interact with the criminal justice system. Fast-track pleas offer 
immigration-crime defendants a reduced sentence in exchange for the 
migrant’s quick consent to removal.
195
 Alan D. Bersin was the U.S. Attorney 
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for the Southern District of California when fast-track plea agreements 
emerged and later the Commissioner of CBP. He has documented how these 
agreements came into being. He notes that the federal government began to 
devote considerable resources to immigration law violations along the nation’s 
southwest border in the mid-1990s and gave the Border Patrol in particular 
more staff, more surveillance equipment, and, most importantly, a new 
computerized database with which to track every person apprehended entering 
the United States clandestinely.
196
 
This computerized tracking system positioned immigration officials quite 
well to identify individuals for prosecution for the federal crime of illegal 
reentry after removal, an offense that is quite difficult to defend against and 
that authorizes as much as twenty years imprisonment (though few receive that 
much).
197
 Realizing that the local federal criminal justice system “was ill 
equipped to handle the large number of additional criminal alien cases,” Bersin 
and his staff launched “a ‘fast-track’ system whereby discovery was provided, 
and a pre-indictment plea offer made, within [twenty-four] hours of 
arraignment.”
198
 Defendants could usually plead to the misdemeanor federal 
crime of illegal entry, which caps imprisonment at six months for a first-time 
offense and two years for subsequent offenses.
199
 
This practice spread like wildfire. Initially limited to the San Diego area, 
by the end of May 2009 there were twenty-seven fast-track programs in 
seventeen judicial districts. On March 1, 2012, it became available for use in 
any jurisdiction in which felony illegal reentry offenses are prosecuted.
200
 A 
2013 analysis of immigration prosecutions nationwide between fiscal years 
2006 and 2009 indicates that 38.1 percent of immigration prosecutions in 
districts that had a fast-track program were fast-tracked.
201
 Most judicial 
districts that regularly use a fast-track program experienced an increase in the 
number of immigration criminal prosecutions alongside increased reliance on 
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fast-track pleas.
202




The fast-track program directly increases immigration imprisonment in 
two ways. First, by raising the stakes of contesting prosecutors’ charges, fast-
track plea agreements have not only hastened the pace of prosecutions but also 
increased the number of criminal immigration cases that prosecutors can 
lodge.
204
 The U.S. Attorneys’ Office that Bersin oversaw, for example, went 
from filing 240 illegal reentry cases in 1994 to 1,334 in 1995.
205
 By 2001, 
roughly five thousand immigration prosecutions were fast-tracked.
206
 Given 
that most immigration offenders are detained before and after conviction (and 
almost all are convicted), increasing the number of prosecutions means 
increasing the number of migrants confined in a given year. Second, the fast-
track program applies only to migrants taken into federal custody. The 
enormous increase in prosecutions that the policy allows, therefore, also 
increases the number of migrants confined. 
Specialized federal criminal procedures involving migrants, like the fast-
track program, do not end there. Despite the requirement in Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that “the court must address the defendant 
personally in open court” before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere,
207
 another initiative relaxes procedural protections afforded 
migrants by altering judges’ conduct. Through Operation Streamline, 
immigration defendants regularly appear en masse.
208
 Rather than process each 
defendant’s case individually, federal judges address multiple defendants 
simultaneously. In some instances, a judge might go through the plea colloquy 
with as many as seventy defendants at once.
209
 Bending normal federal 
criminal procedures allows federal prosecutors and judges to move substantial 
numbers of immigration defendants through the court system. 
Though Operation Streamline allows judicial efficiency to rise, it does so 
at an important and obvious cost: comprehension. A judge speaking to a 
courtroom full of immigration defendants at the same time cannot be sure that 
they understand what is happening. Indeed, a judge cannot be sure what every 
defendant is saying or even whether every defendant is saying something. As 
the Ninth Circuit put it, Operation Streamline proceedings result in “an 
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indistinct murmur or medley of yeses.”
210
 The Ninth Circuit is an outlier in its 
resistance. Operation Streamline proceedings regularly operate in federal 
district courts throughout the Southwest.
211
 Even in the Ninth Circuit, 
Operation Streamline continues, though in a slightly modified fashion; judges 
now accept pleas individually or in small groups while the rest of the plea 
colloquy can still be performed en masse.
212
 
C. State Immigration Imprisonment 
Other programs have moved and continue to move migrants into jails and 
prisons as a result of state or local officers’ efforts. No initiative better reflects 
this practice than the much-discussed “287(g) program.” Under the 
presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, DHS relied heavily on 
intergovernmental law enforcement initiatives authorized by INA section 
287(g). That statutory provision allows DHS to enter into agreements with 
local law enforcement agencies to essentially deputize local police officers to 
conduct their own investigations of violations of federal immigration law.
213
 
Though ICE has significantly scaled down its reliance on 287(g) programs to 
identify potentially removable individuals, the Agency continues to operate 
thirty-six 287(g) programs throughout the United States.
214
 ICE claims that 
287(g) has identified 373,800 potentially removable migrants since January 
2006.
215
 Though this figure does not indicate how many of those migrants were 
detained, there is reason to believe that 287(g) has resulted in hundreds of 
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thousands of detentions, because at least 108,000 detainers were issued as a 
result of 287(g) investigations during the 2009 and 2010 fiscal years alone.
216
 
Meanwhile, a similar phenomenon has occurred at the state level. The one 
section of Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070, the so-called “show-me-your-papers” 
law, that survived constitutional challenge requires state or local police officers 
to check the immigration status of people they suspect lack authorization to be 
present in the United States.
217
 Though it raises important practical questions of 
how well-equipped police officers are to gauge whether a person is “unlawfully 
present” in the United States,
218
 this requirement leaves little doubt that state 
and local police are to become central figures in regulating migration. 
Moreover, by converting police into immigration law investigators, the law 
forces officers to depart from the typical practice of investigating state criminal 
conduct. In the process, it increases the contact points through which 
immigration imprisonment might result. 
At times, state governments and localities participate in moving 
individuals into immigration imprisonment by responding to financial 
incentives offered by the federal government. The State Criminal Alien 
Assistance Program (SCAAP) taps state and local criminal law enforcement 
processes to move migrants into immigration imprisonment by offering to pay 
part of the cost of confinement.
219
 Created by a provision of the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and run by the Justice Department, 
SCAAP reimburses state and local governments “for a portion of the 
correctional officer salary costs associated with incarcerating”
220
 unauthorized 
migrants who have been convicted of either one felony or two misdemeanors, 
and “were incarcerated for [four] or more consecutive days.”
221
 
To determine who fits the SCAAP eligibility criteria, the federal 
government requires that local law enforcement agents “us[e] ‘due diligence’ to 
identify and report eligible undocumented individuals to ICE,” which 
determines whether they lack authorization to be in the United States.
222
 By 
conditioning reimbursement on a requirement that police officials help identify 
potentially removable individuals, SCAAP widens the net of immigration law 
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screening—all while individuals are firmly within the custody of state or local 
officials.
223
 After examining SCAAP’s operations across several years, legal 
scholar Anjana Malhotra concluded that “SCAAP and ICE statistics suggest 
that local agencies are referring large numbers of individuals that could be 
subject to civil or criminal violations through SCAAP.”
224
 Malhotra found that, 
under the aegis of SCAAP, “local agencies referred more than 660,000 eligible 
criminal alien inmates to ICE” from 2004 to 2011, all of whom were 
potentially removable under civil immigration law.
225
 Meanwhile, police 
agencies identified approximately another 162,000 detained migrants who “had 
been previously arrested at least once for a criminal or civil immigration 
offense prior to their referral,” meaning they were likely eligible for criminal 
prosecutions for illegal reentry.
226
 
D. Federal-State Crossover Immigration Imprisonment 
While criminal and civil administrative law provide the legal basis 
justifying detention, the federal government has crafted an important set of 
initiatives designed to ensure that any migrant interacting with law enforcement 
who has engaged in unauthorized conduct remains within the control of 
policing authorities, which is to say, imprisoned. These initiatives meld 
criminal justice and administrative processes while simultaneously tapping the 
resources of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Chief among 
these are the Criminal Alien Program (CAP) and Secure Communities. 
CAP increases the government’s ability to detain more people, with the 
goal of removing the maximum number of migrants who engage in criminal 
activity, regardless of whether that activity is directly related to immigration.
227
 
To achieve this objective, CAP depends on close collaboration between 
criminal law enforcement agencies and ICE.
228
 Its sizeable dedicated staff—
approximately 1,250 ICE officers—is assigned to jails and prisons nationwide 
as well as to off-site videoconferencing sites.
229
 The ICE officers screen for 
removability of people arrested upon suspicion of committing a crime or 
incarcerated after conviction.
230
 A specialized initiative within CAP provides 
additional resources to law enforcement agencies in the Phoenix area. Under 
this initiative, CAP personnel must respond to law enforcement requests about 
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an arrestee’s immigration status around-the-clock. In fiscal year 2011, this 
initiative alone resulted in more than 1,700 arrests.
231
 
Another specialized CAP component, the Violent Criminal Alien Section 
(VCAS), flags for federal prosecutors individuals who have allegedly 
committed federal immigration crimes. In fiscal year 2013 alone, VCAS helped 
produce 7,650 criminal indictments.
232
 To make this work possible, Congress 
has supported CAP with approximately $1.4 billion between the 2004 and 2013 




CAP has been quite successful with respect to the number of people taken 
into ICE custody. Between 2004 and 2011, the Agency arrested 1,116,877 
people through CAP, making this the ICE program that led to most arrests 
during this eight-year period.
234
 In New York, CAP is responsible for 77 
percent of all ICE apprehensions, including almost 6,500 arrests in 2008.
235
 
Importantly, many of these individuals are not prosecuted or convicted of a 
crime. A study of CAP arrests in New York City, for example, showed that 37 
percent of migrants taken into ICE custody through CAP had no criminal 
history; New York Police Department officers merely arrested and booked 
them and then transferred them to ICE.
236
 Overall, then, CAP has expanded the 
federal government’s practice of imprisoning migrants like no other single 
policy innovation. 
Another DHS initiative, the Secure Communities program, likewise 
demonstrates the federal government’s willingness to blur the criminal and 
civil law enforcement distinction to expand its ability to detain migrants. 
Launched in just six counties and Boston in 2008, the program was active in 
every jurisdiction in the United States by January 22, 2013.
237
 Where CAP 
places ICE officers in jails and prisons throughout the country to gather the 
information necessary to determine whether an arrestee is potentially 
removable, Secure Communities relies on the state and local police officers 
who are already in those jails and prisons to gather that information and 
electronically forward it to DHS.
238
 Even prior to this program, law 
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enforcement officers at various levels shared investigative information. When 
police officers across the country make arrests in furtherance of their traditional 
public safety functions, they routinely send fingerprint data to their state’s 
criminal records repository.
239
 Those state agencies then forward the fingerprint 
data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for criminal background 
checks.
240
 Secure Communities builds on that time-tested practice by 
instructing the FBI to share the fingerprint data it receives from the local police 
with DHS, which then runs the data through its massive immigration-specific 
databases.
241
 DHS then determines which arrestees are potentially removable 
from the United States for a civil violation of immigration laws.
242
 Either 
before or after conclusion of the criminal process resulting from the migrant’s 
arrest, ICE agents frequently take custody of migrants flagged through the 
Secure Communities database queries, and begin the removal process.
243
 
Indeed, ICE agents frequently take identified migrants into custody even when 
no criminal process follows the arrest, either because criminal charges were not 
filed or were dropped soon after filing. In this way, Secure Communities “has 
transformed the landscape of immigration enforcement by allowing ICE to 
effectively run federal immigration checks on every individual booked into a 
local county jail, usually while still in pretrial custody.”
244
 
Though it relies on the policing work of criminal justice actors, Secure 
Communities has had an enormous impact on civil immigration imprisonment. 
In 2009, the first full fiscal year after the program’s launch, ICE removed 
10,688 individuals who had been convicted of some crime.
245
 ICE did not 
report how many were detained pending removal proceedings, but, given their 
criminal histories, the likelihood is that most spent time in an immigration 
prison. Indeed, 3,368 of these individuals were convicted of an aggravated 
felony or at least two felonies, making them subject to mandatory custody 
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years later, in fiscal year 2013, Secure Communities identified “190,951 . . . 
individuals charged with or convicted of Level 1 offenses, which include 
violent crimes . . . and other aggravated felonies.”
247
 An analysis of Secure 
Communities’ operations as of January 31, 2010, indicated that 83 percent of 
people identified through Secure Communities were booked into ICE custody, 
compared to 62 percent of all people apprehended by DHS.
248
 Overall, 
according to a separate report analyzing data between the program’s launch in 
October 2008 and May 31, 2011, “more than 260,000 people were . . . booked 
into ICE custody as a result” of a Secure Communities database hit.
249
 
Importantly, at its highest point during the time span covered by this study, 
Secure Communities was active in roughly 45 percent of jurisdictions in the 
United States,
250
 a far cry from the 100 percent coverage it later claimed,
251
 
suggesting that many more people were eventually identified and detained 
pursuant to this initiative. 
Moreover, it seems that few are able to get out of detention on bond while 
removal proceedings are ongoing. ICE granted bond to a mere 2 percent of 
people taken into custody under Secure Communities, while only slightly 
more—6 percent—received bond redetermination hearings before an 
immigration judge.
252
 On average, migrants detained through Secure 
Communities spent twenty-eight days confined, though researchers identified 
one person whom ICE had detained for more than five hundred days.
253
 
In a rather extraordinary turn of events, Secure Communities came under 
intense criticism even as it was rolled out. Activists, advocates, law 
enforcement officials, and several prominent elected officials complained that 
the program drove an unnecessary and unwanted wedge between police 
agencies and migrant communities.
254
 Responding to that criticism, on 
November 20, 2014, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson announced 
that DHS would terminate Secure Communities.
255
 
Whatever victory critics might have declared was short-lived. In the very 
memorandum in which Johnson declared Secure Communities’ demise, he 
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announced its replacement: the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP).
256
 As 
with Secure Communities, DHS officers following the PEP protocol will take 
fingerprint data obtained by state or local police officers and sift it through 
DHS immigration databases. Because DHS claims it will only take custody of 
individuals who meet its top civil immigration enforcement priorities, PEP is 
more narrowly tailored than Secure Communities. Though this will likely 
affect the specific characteristics of the people taken into ICE custody, it is 
unlikely to affect how many people are moved into immigration imprisonment, 
because there is no shortage of people who meet the department’s highest 
enforcement priorities. Moreover, PEP does not fundamentally alter the process 
for identifying and moving such people into immigration imprisonment. Like 
Secure Communities, it uses the resources of the state criminal justice system 
to identify individuals for civil immigration detention. 
On the whole, this panoply of initiatives creates a broad net that leads 
hundreds of thousands of people into jails, prisons, or immigration detention 
centers annually for allegedly having engaged in prohibited migration-related 
activity. This is not a reality to be taken lightly. Part IV explains why this 
reality came to be. 
IV. 
RHETORIC OF CRIMINALITY 
Immigration law has been subsumed under a rhetoric of criminality that 
frames migrants as the specter of dangerousness.
257
 Legislators and government 
bureaucrats, disinclined to release ostensibly dangerous individuals onto the 
streets, have every incentive to favor imprisonment.
258
 Being able to point to 
the steel and concrete of prison walls and the annual statistics of an ever-
greater number of people incarcerated because of a suspected or confirmed 
immigration law violation gives political actors the proof they need to show the 
public that they are doing something about the danger in our midst.
259
 
A. Migrant Vilification 
In the 1980s, law and politics in the United States began to focus more on 
the threat of crime and the danger migrants pose. This new focus accompanied 
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a greater desire to punish. Among the most influential examples of this legal 
and political shift is the “broken windows” theory popularized in an influential 
Atlantic Monthly article by James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling. The article 
posited that minor crime would progressively lead to more serious crime if not 
quashed.
260
 The push to “crack[] down on crime” quickly led to the massive 
and racially skewed criminal incarceration growth that legal scholar Michelle 
Alexander has dubbed the “new Jim Crow”
261
 and sociologist Loïc Wacquant 
refers to as “hyperincarceration.”
262
 
Following in that vein, for roughly the last thirty years, public discussions 
of immigration and migrants have frequently included references to crime and 
dangerousness. Cubans who left the island from the port of Mariel in the early 
1980s were thought to have been the cast-offs from Castro’s prisons and, as the 
title of a 1984 U.S. News & World Report article put it, represented “Castro’s 
‘Crime Bomb’ Inside [the] U.S.”
263
 Perhaps the most memorable example of 
this linkage between Cuban migrants and crime comes from the 1983 
Hollywood thriller Scarface, in which Al Pacino stars as a young Cuban 
migrant who becomes a violent drug trafficker in Florida.
264
 Like the Cubans, 
the Haitians who arrived in large numbers in the early 1980s were also linked 
to crime. Reflecting their racialization as black, they were viewed as having 
melded into the allegedly rampant drug activity carried out by African 
Americans.
265
 Much the same goes for Jamaican migrants. As Republican 
Congressman Lamar Smith claimed in 1987, “Jamaicans, mostly illegal aliens, 
have developed a massive criminal organization that imports and distributes 
narcotics.”
266
 More recently, another Republican Congressman, Steve King 
from Iowa, dismissed efforts to provide a legalization path for unauthorized 
migrants brought to the United States as children by alleging, “For every one 
who’s a valedictorian, there’s another 100 out there who weigh 130 pounds and 
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they’ve got calves the size of cantaloupes because they’re hauling 75 pounds of 
marijuana across the desert.”
267
 
This rhetoric has fundamentally changed the discursive boundaries about 
migration. Rather than viewing migrants as deserving individuals in need of 
safe harbor in the United States or as morally upright people coming to the 
United States to work and perhaps reunite with family, migrants are frequently 
portrayed as criminals.
268
 And as criminals, they are thought to be enemies of 
the law-abiding public.
269
 Once migrants were framed this way, it became 




B. Migrant Penalization 
In a long series of statutes, Congress and multiple presidential 
administrations enacted legislation that unmistakably linked immigrants with 
criminality and, by extension, dangerousness. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986, for example, authorized state and local law enforcement agencies to 
request that the INS detain people believed to lack authorization to be in the 
United States and who had been arrested on suspicion of having violated a 
controlled substance offense.
271
 Less than two weeks later, the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986, best known for its amnesty provisions 
allowing millions of unauthorized migrants to regularize their status, statutorily 
defined a “Marielito Cuban” as a Cuban national convicted of a felony and 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and required the Justice Department to 
reimburse states for incarcerating them.
272
 Two years later the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988 funded INS agents’ involvement in a multiagency task force 
“combating illegal alien involvement in drug trafficking and crimes of 
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violence.”
273
 That statute also introduced the “aggravated alien felon” into the 
immigration law lexicon, referring to a type of crime committed, according to 
U.S. Senator Alfonse D’Amato, by “a particularly dangerous class.”
274
 
Originally defined as a conviction for murder, illicit trafficking in firearms, or 
drug trafficking, the “aggravated felony” concept has since expanded to include 
twenty-one categories of crimes, some of which include subparts, that range 
from the most serious offenses to crimes as banal as mutilating a passport.
275
 
The immigrant-crime entanglement continued unimpeded through the 
1990s. President George H.W. Bush launched that decade’s version of the 
immigration-crime rhetoric by describing the Immigration Act of 1990 as 
important to his administration’s “war on drugs and violent crime,” in part 
because “it provides for the expeditious deportation of aliens who, by their 
violent criminal acts, forfeit their right to remain in this country.”
276
 These are 
people, he added, who “jeopardize the safety and well-being of every American 
resident.”
277
 In 1994, President Bill Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, a bill that, among other things, created the 
SCAAP, which continues to fund state and local expenses incurred 
incarcerating migrants.
278
 Two years later, Congress sent President Clinton a 
pair of well-known bills, which he signed, that dramatically expanded the 
immigration-crime nexus and, most pertinent here, the use of imprisonment. 
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) expanded the 
federal government’s administrative immigration detention authorization.
279
 
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, enacted a 
few months after AEDPA, created the 287(g) programs that DHS continues to 
use to identify and detain potentially removable migrants. It also expanded the 
federal government’s computerized database of immigration status information, 
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Though there has not been much immigration legislation enacted in the 
twenty-first century, the few pieces that have made it through Congress and 
past the President have continued the trend of framing immigration as a threat. 
The Real ID Act of 2005, for example, placed special emphasis on terrorist 
activity performed by migrants.
281
 A year after Congress passed the Real ID 
Act, the House of Representatives approved a bill that would have made 
unauthorized presence in the United States, with nothing more, a federal 
crime.
282
 The bill ultimately failed in the Senate after massive immigrants’ 
rights protests, but not before it entrenched the impression that unauthorized 
immigration was socially deviant.
283
 
C. Migrant Institutionalization 
Prison, of course, is not inevitable.
284
 There is nothing natural about 
forcibly losing one’s liberty at the hands of the state. As legal scholar Malcolm 
Feeley noted in his study of the growth of prisons, “The prison was not at all 
obvious. Despite the fact that the prison is now so much taken for granted that 
it has become synonymous with punishment, it was not always a foregone 
conclusion.”
285
 Instead, it “was a product of the imagination of the late 18th 
century,” conceived and disseminated in large part by a distinct set of people 
Feeley describes as “entrepreneurs” who touted the prison as a means of 
punishing offenders and offering them the opportunity to repent (hence the 
term “penitentiary”) “at no or low cost to the state.”
286
 This rationalization 
quickly took root in the United Kingdom and the United States, and the prison 
as an institution took on a life of its own. “[W]ithin 50 years,” Feeley writes, 
“the prison was so well inscribed in public imagination and so well established 
on the landscape, that it was impossible to envision criminal punishment in its 
absence. The prison had become synonymous with punishment.”
287
 Eventually, 
in Feeley’s view, rationalization gave way to inertia. “[O]nce established, 
conscience gave way to convenience”—that is, the prison continued to exist 
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Though imprisonment became a core component of criminal punishment, 
it was by no means the default sanction for criminal offenses in the United 
States.
289
 Well into the second half of the twentieth century, “the main official 
objective of criminal justice was correction.”
290
 Imprisonment was an available 
option, but conviction frequently resulted in community supervision rather than 
incarceration.
291
 “[P]enal confinement,” writes sociologist Bruce Western, 
“was reserved for the most dangerous and incorrigible.”
292
 
Beginning in the 1970s, the state and federal criminal justice systems 
altered course from a focus on rehabilitation to a desire for punishment.
293
 
Through a series of cultural and legal shifts that legal scholar and sociologist 
David Garland has dubbed the “culture of control,”
294
 the well-known era of 
mass incarceration was born. 
As with the inevitability of the prison in Feeley’s account, there is 
certainly nothing preordained about migrants losing their liberty behind barbed 
wire and under the watchful eyes of security personnel. Though the first statute 
authorizing detention of migrants for immigration-related activity was enacted 
in 1891, imprisonment as a feature of immigration law enforcement is a 
historical anomaly.
295
 With a few notable exceptions—Ellis Island on the East 
Coast and especially Angel Island on the West Coast
296
—governments in the 
United States have rarely detained individuals suspected of violating 
immigration law. Indeed, from 1954 to 1980, the INS followed an internal 
policy of not detaining except in unusual circumstances.
297
 That historical 
practice changed suddenly in the early 1980s in response to the arrival of large 
numbers of Cubans, Haitians, and Central Americans who were depicted as 
dangerous and undeserving of the United States’ hospitality.
298
 In reaction to 
this influx, Congress and multiple presidential administrations worked together 
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Despite the relatively recent entry of large-scale immigration 
imprisonment on the scene, politicians, bureaucrats, and advocates have now 
largely accepted imprisonment’s central role in immigration policing. Few 
people of any political persuasion publicly question the need to detain 
migrants. In fact, many speak of imprisonment as a necessary component of a 
“common sense” approach to immigration law reform.
300
 Without detention, it 
would seem, there cannot be deportation and without deportation there is no 
enforcement of immigration law.
301
 Detention came to be viewed as a natural 
and required feature of effective immigration law enforcement policy.
302
 
Emblematically, the disputes about the immigration-imprisonment system 
focus on the scope of detention and the particulars of detention conditions, 
which only highlight the lack of serious disagreement about the basic need for 
such a system at all. Some members of Congress, for example, insist on 
requiring ICE to pay for thirty-four thousand prison beds each night, while 
DHS officials think that ICE should detain only those assessed as a flight risk 
or public safety threat.
303
 Advocates frequently decry the use of criminal 
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prosecutions and incarceration to punish immigration law violations, seeking to 
keep immigration enforcement formally civil. Academics and advocates, 
meanwhile, criticize DHS’s continued reliance on correctional norms to detain 
migrants, insisting that civil immigration detention should not resemble penal 
confinement.
304
 But it is the rare politician, government official, academic, 
immigrants’ rights advocate, immigration restriction proponent, or even activist 
who challenges the premise that the United States ought to maintain an 
immigration-detention system in the first place.
305
 At some point, then, the use 
of imprisonment to enforce immigration law came to be seemingly beyond 
question—that is, immigration imprisonment became so ordinary that it 
became difficult to imagine a world without it. 
That imprisonment is now viewed as normal represents the triumph of a 
particular political project. Political scientist Alfonso Gonzales refers to this 
project as the “anti-migrant bloc,” while others, including sociologist Tanya 
Golash-Boza and political scientists Roxanne Lynne Doty and Elizabeth 
Shannon Wheatley, describe it as the “immigration industrial complex.”
306
 To 
Gonzales, the anti-migrant bloc consists of “a contradictory and fluid 
constellation of forces composed of elected officials, state bureaucrats, think 
tanks, intellectuals, and charismatic media personalities who, under the 
influence of strategic fractions of global capital, have set the boundaries of the 
immigration debate around narrow questions of criminality and anti-
terrorism.”
307
 Golash-Boza explains that “[t]he immigration industrial complex 
refers to the public and private sector interests in the criminalization of 
undocumented migration, immigration law enforcement and the promotion of 
‘anti-illegal’ rhetoric.”
308
 For their part, Doty and Wheatley claim that “the 
contemporary immigration industrial complex is a massive, multifaceted, and 
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intricate economy of power, which is composed of a widespread, diverse, and 
self-perpetuating collection of organizations, laws, ideas, and actors” that 
“mutually reinforce one another and expand the realms of authority to which 
people are subjected.”
309
 Though each of these scholars presents a different 
analysis of contemporary immigration law enforcement, they all identify a 
broad array of actors that have collectively framed discussions of immigration 
around notions of danger. These actors have then used that discursive 
framework of danger to promote legislation and policy initiatives intended to 
contain the danger. Part V identifies the actual actors, policy choices, and legal 
directives that have converted the rhetoric of criminality into the practice of 
immigration imprisonment. 
V. 
ENTRENCHING IMMIGRATION IMPRISONMENT 
Immigration imprisonment is undoubtedly rooted in political responses to 
the rhetoric of migrant criminality. In this Part, I show that immigration 
imprisonment has become embedded in the practices of numerous 
governmental and nongovernmental institutions, as well as in interpretations of 
statutory directives and ambiguities. 
There are three primary phenomena that constantly drive immigration 
imprisonment. First, having thoroughly embraced the rhetoric of criminality 
and its view of migrants as threatening, government authorities have repeatedly 
adopted policy choices that expand imprisonment even in the face of 
reasonable alternatives. They have become locked into imprisonment as a 
policy. Second, immigration-policing agencies, as institutions are prone to do, 
consistently interpret imprisonment imperatives in a way that expands their 
own power. Federal and state authorities have created an immigration 
imprisonment dragnet out of a modicum of statutory authority to imprison. 
Third, a host of third parties have developed to facilitate immigration 
imprisonment. In their own way, each of these institutions pressures legislators 
to maintain and expand imprisonment. 
A. Path Dependence 
“Institutions,” wrote the political scientist Claus Offe in his study of 
decision making within political institutions, “can breed conservatism.”
310
 The 
institutions involved in immigration imprisonment are no exception. Whether 
at the federal, state, or local level, people operating within larger institutional 
cultures make the myriad decisions that affect imprisonment. The values and 
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processes of the existing institutional culture constrain the choices available to 
each of these individuals.
311
 
One of the most poignant features of any institutional culture is the effect 
of previous policy decisions on future decisions.
312
 A truly naturalized policy 
choice reinforces itself by, in part, determining future policy developments.
313
 
Referred to as the theory of “path dependence,” this phenomenon suggests that 
some “decision[s] limit[] the range of available options at subsequent points 
and, in so doing, encourage[] continuity in the form of a retention of the 
original choice.”
314
 In effect, the actions of government actors—whether 
elected politicians or employed civil servants—are limited by what those actors 
envision possible.
315
 As political scientist R. Kent Weaver explains, 
governmental policies become “‘sticky,’ if not ‘locked in’ . . . . [O]nce policy 
regimes have become deeply embedded, policy change should be primarily 
within the parameters of that regime.”
316
 This is not to say that policy shifts are 
impossible, only that “reversal may be rendered more difficult by the path-
dependent effect.”
317
 To gauge whether institutions have adopted a path-
dependent policy-making approach, political scientist and historian Randall 
Hansen argues that it is necessary to examine whether “policy divergence was 
considered and rejected for reasons that cannot be explained without reference 
to the structure of costs and incentives created by the original policy choice.”
318
 
The discursive link between crime and immigration suggests that path-
dependence theory can help explain the evolution of immigration-
imprisonment practices. For the last thirty years or so, the culture of 
governmental discussions on immigration has portrayed migrants as 
deviants.
319
 The rhetoric of criminality that now pervades has not always 
framed immigration law. Importantly, it only came to be this way through 
deliberate choices by key actors in and out of government.
320
 As a result, 
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immigration law enforcement, including imprisonment, is now conceived of as 
a security issue.
321
 Viewed as part of the state’s efforts to keep the public safe, 
immigration imprisonment has come to be seen as a necessary component of 
government operations. Without strenuously wielding the power of 




A prime example of this discursive phenomenon publicly manifested 
itself in February 2013. That month, ICE officials released 2,228 detainees due 
to budget cuts resulting from Congress’s failure to enact an appropriations bill. 
Before releasing these individuals, ICE conducted public safety and flight risk 
assessments and released only those presenting a low probability of both risks. 
Despite that, prominent members of Congress illustrated how the rhetoric of 
criminality locks legislators into favoring imprisonment. Speaker of the House 
of Representatives John Boehner said that ICE’s actions “let[] criminals go 
free.”
323
 His Republican colleague Bob Goodlatte, chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, added, “By releasing criminal immigrants onto the 
streets, the administration is needlessly endangering American lives.”
324
 
Boehner, Goodlatte, and others who made similar claims did so despite the fact 
that approximately half of all detainees have not been convicted of any crime 
and of those that have been, few have been convicted of a violent offense.
325
 
Critically, these legislators view migrants as dangerous and thus believe it 
appropriate for the government to mitigate this risk through imprisonment. 
Having thoroughly subscribed to the rhetoric of criminality and the policy 
choice of incarceration, they view a failure to keep these migrants confined as 
synonymous with failing to protect the public. 
The rhetoric of criminality has similarly locked DHS into viewing its 
immigration law enforcement efforts—among which imprisonment stands 
out—as critical to public safety, and therefore necessary. As DHS Secretary 
Jeh Johnson put it, “Homeland security is the most important mission any 
government can provide to its people.”
326
 Two of the five operational areas that 
the department lists as its “core missions” concern immigration-related 
activities that subject substantial numbers of people to immigration 
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imprisonment.
327
 In addition to operating the nation’s civil immigration-
detention system, DHS’s ICE and CBP units identify and apprehend the bulk of 
people incarcerated due to alleged immigration law violations. Like their parent 
department, both Agencies view their work as critical to public safety. ICE, the 
principal Agency that pushes people into civil immigration detention, claims 
that its “primary mission is to promote homeland security and public safety.”
328
 
For his part, the CBP commissioner claims that the Agency’s mission is 
“keeping dangerous people and dangerous things away from the American 
homeland.”
329
 CBP agents identify most of the migrants who are placed in 
criminal immigration detention. 
Viewing its work as essential to the nation’s security, DHS has 
implemented a series of initiatives that have dramatically increased the number 
of people detained on suspicion of immigration law violations. Reflecting a 
path-dependent course, most of these efforts have been created on the 
department’s initiative, suggesting an unwillingness to diverge from the 
immigration-imprisonment policy choice.
330
 For one, DHS created Secure 
Communities, one of the programs most responsible for the size of today’s 
migrant prisoner population, without any obvious external impetus to do so. 
Indeed, it remains unclear what, if any, legal authority DHS has to run this 
program.
331
 As legal scholar Anil Kalhan explains, “No statute unquestionably 
authorizes the program or mandates state and local participation, and no 
regulations specifically govern its operations.”
332
 The department created 
Secure Communities after Congress gave DHS money to “improve and 
modernize efforts to identify aliens convicted of a crime, sentenced to 
imprisonment, and who may be deportable.”
333
 Given the broad congressional 
command to “improve and modernize” identification measures, DHS could 
have created a program that led to little detention. It could, for example, have 
followed the congressional directive to focus on migrants who have previously 
been convicted of crimes, rather than almost everyone who comes into contact 
with police officers. In addition, DHS could have elected to track potentially 
deportable migrants through alternatives to detention. Instead, DHS took this 
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vague congressional instruction to improve and modernize identification 
processes and launched a law enforcement program that identifies migrants 
well before a conviction and sentence could possibly be imposed—at the point 
when a migrant is booked into police custody.
334
 By checking the immigration 
status of every person taken into police custody whose identification 
information has been sent to the FBI, Secure Communities allows DHS to limit 
the possibility that a migrant will be released from incarceration.
335
 In effect, 
Secure Communities paves the road from penal to civil confinement for no 
reason except that the department is unable or unwilling to imagine policies 
that diverge from its focus on imprisonment. 
Likewise, the former INS created another key imprisonment program, 
CAP, in response to statutory language that was anything but a clear mandate 
to imprison. As part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(IRCA), Congress instructed the INS to “expeditiously” begin deportation 
proceedings against migrants convicted of deportable offenses.
336
 Two years 
later, the INS established a pair of programs—the Institutional Removal 
Program (IRP) and the Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP)—that 
would eventually become CAP.
337
 The IRP and ACAP both sought to remove 
people who were already incarcerated as a result of a criminal conviction.
338
 
Nothing in the statutory text requires more, but that is exactly the path that 
immigration law enforcement officials followed. Today, CAP operates much 
more expansively than IRCA commanded. Instead of waiting for a conviction, 
CAP targets migrants as soon as they are booked into police custody—well 
before a conviction is possible—and sometimes earlier in the law enforcement 
process.
339
 Its broader reach means that CAP frequently leads to arrests and 
criminal indictments.
340
 CAP therefore demonstrates how the choice to 
perceive immigration enforcement as a security concern means that every 
immigration violator is a threat, and so a violation—without anything more—
justifies detention. 
Similarly, DHS’s approach to a law enforcement program authorized by 
statute, the 287(g) agreement initiative, suggests a solitary policing focus that 
relies ever-more heavily on imprisonment. The statute allows DHS to enter into 
agreements with local law enforcement agencies through which local officers 
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detention is one of the powers available, the statute does not require DHS to 
take priority over investigation or apprehension. It could have used the 287(g) 
program to identify potentially removable individuals and initiate removal 
proceedings without emphasizing detention. Instead, the department chose to 
harness 287(g)’s detention potential. As then-ICE Assistant Secretary John 
Morton explained in 2009, 287(g) allows the Agency to better accomplish its 
“key enforcement priorities—the arrest and detention of criminal aliens who 
pose the greatest threat to the public safety or danger to the community.”
342
 
Given the securitization prism through which DHS officials see their 
work, they are not likely to alter the practices that lead hundreds of thousands 
of people into the detention and deportation pipeline each year.
343
 Indeed, with 
immigration framed as a threat, scaling back enforcement tactics to any 
significant degree would be tantamount to DHS abdicating its responsibility to 
protect the homeland. Secretary Johnson’s comments about the number of 
people that constitute “public safety, national security, [or] border security 
threats” and therefore merit placement in civil immigration detention, illustrate 
this point. According to Johnson, DHS needs to accommodate 30,539 migrants 
who fit this risk assessment.
344
 That is a reduction of 3,461 beds from the 
thirty-four thousand beds Congress currently requires it to maintain.
345
 Though 
notable, this reduction represents a mere 10 percent of the federal government’s 
daily capacity for civil immigration detention. Moreover, Johnson did not 
explain why DHS needed to hold almost 31,000 migrants in detention given 
that only a small number of the people it currently detains have been convicted 
of a violent crime.
346
 Nor did he address why migrants convicted of a violent 
offense or otherwise could not be supervised through alternative means. 
Relatedly, the department has steadfastly failed to expand its use of ATD 
despite repeated calls by internal and external observers to do so.
347
 In 2009, 
for example, ICE’s ATD programs had the capacity to supervise eighteen 
thousand people.
348
 By fiscal year 2014, the Agency’s ATD capacity had 
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grown only slightly to twenty-two thousand.
349
 The Agency’s ATD options 
vary in their restrictiveness of migrants’ movements, but all impose 
significantly fewer restrictions than detention and have an impressive rate of 
success at encouraging migrants’ appearance at court hearings—a 93.8 percent 
appearance rate in fiscal year 2010 according to ICE.
350
 These alternatives 
could help DHS reach its goal of ensuring that migrants depart the United 
States if ordered to do so and at a fraction of the cost.
351
 Despite that, DHS has 
never placed much emphasis on growing its ATD capacity, again suggesting 
that it is locked into its imprisonment focus.
352
 
The department’s position on a congressional requirement to maintain 
thirty-four thousand detention beds suggests a similar path-dependent approach 
to imprisonment. The appropriations act President Obama signed into law in 
January 2014 provides that DHS “shall maintain a level of not less than 34,000 
detention beds.”
353
 Budget bills stretching back to 2010 have included similar 
language.
354
 DHS has consistently taken the position that this language requires 
it to detain thirty-four thousand migrants each day. The text, however, does not 
reference the number of detainees. Instead, the text merely requires DHS to pay 
for the specified number of beds. DHS Secretary Johnson recently 
acknowledged this alternative reading of the budget’s text,
355
 but the 
department has not acted on this recognition by shifting away from detention. 
That the department interprets the congressionally authored text in a way that 
leads to mass imprisonment suggests that Agency actors have locked 
themselves into this position and struggle to follow other possibilities, even 
possibilities written into the statute. 
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Diverging from immigration imprisonment would require DHS to 
overcome the values and processes that lead to its large-scale civil immigration 
detention practice.
356
 The path-dependent choices department officials have 
made for years, however, make reversal all the more difficult.
357
 For one, 
shifting away from imprisonment would require that DHS empty thousands of 
prison beds that Congress currently requires it to pay for and that it has made a 
habit of filling. Without question, this would create an unpleasant public-
relations affair for department officials because of the widespread belief that 
detention is needed to ensure public safety and migrants’ appearances at court 
hearings. It would also require a fundamental reimagining of how immigration 
officials view available prison beds. ICE officers view unused prison beds as 
beds that need to be filled.
358
 At times, they even gauge their enforcement 
measures based on available detention space, an NFOP practice verified by the 
department’s inspector general.
359
 DHS, therefore, is quite unlikely to diverge 
from its profound commitment to imprisonment as a key immigration law 
enforcement tool. 
Instead of diverging from their practice of heavily using imprisonment as 
a means of enforcing immigration law, DHS officials debate the contours of 
detention. They regularly consider the conditions of confinement, the most 
suitable locations for prisons, the cost of detention, and even the best number 
of people to confine. This constant reexamination of detention gives Agency 
officials the aura of self-critique. To be sure, these are important issues that 
deserve attention. What this line of inquiry does not do, however, is challenge 
the presumption that imprisonment is necessary. 
B. Institutional Auto-Expansion 
Relatedly, institutions tend to take an expansive view of their own 
authority—that is, once they acquire power, they are prone to try to hold onto 
it.
360
 This phenomenon appears repeatedly in the immigration-imprisonment 
context, in which both federal agencies and state governments have taken 
expansive views of their own authority, even in the face of statutory language 
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CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 992 (1999). 
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First, ICE and its predecessor, the INS, have taken a broad view of their 
detention authority; this view has manifested itself in ways Congress did not 
require. For example, the INS took the position—since rejected by the Supreme 
Court—that the INA allowed it to indefinitely detain migrants deemed a flight 
or safety risk after they had been ordered removed.
362
 ICE continues to take the 
position that it can detain any migrant indefinitely before the migrant has been 
ordered removed, though a growing number of courts have disagreed.
363
 The 
Agency also takes the view that Congress requires it to detain thirty-four 
thousand people per day, though the text enacted into law actually references a 




Second, the Justice Department has likewise taken a broad view of the 
statutory power to detain migrants. In a 2009 decision, the Justice 
Department’s BIA held that the INA’s command that DHS “take into custody” 
anyone subject to a broad range of removal grounds cannot be satisfied by 
anything short of detention.
365
 By interpreting Congress’s use of the term 
“custody” as synonymous with “detention,” the BIA adopted only one of 
multiple reasonable interpretations of the statute.
366
 It could just as reasonably 
have concluded that detention is merely one among many forms of custody.
367
 
Though it was presented with this option, it instead took a route that results in 
more detention.
368
 The extraordinariness of the BIA’s use of imprisonment as 
an option of choice is illustrated by the stance of another Justice Department 
unit, the INS, twenty years earlier. In the late 1980s, when immigration 
imprisonment was just emerging as a central tool of immigration law 
enforcement, an INS spokesman explained, “To be in detention doesn’t mean 
that you have to be behind a fence.”
369
 Now that BIA has naturalized decades 
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of immigration imprisonment, the position taken by the INS of 1989 seems a 
long way away. 
Third, states have at times exercised their detention power broadly to 
reach a broader range of migrants. Arizona, for example, not only took the 
unusual step of prosecuting migrants under the State’s human-smuggling 
provision but also sought to limit the ability of migrants imprisoned on 
suspicion of violating a serious felony (which the legislature defined to include 
human smuggling) to leave jail.
370
 Numerous other states have also adopted 
substantive laws and procedural rules that have expanded the possible bases for 
incarceration due to immigration-related activity.
371
 
C. Third Party Pressure 
Having locked itself into the policy choice of using imprisonment to 
enforce immigration law, the federal government has—perhaps inadvertently—
created a body of third parties dependent on that policy choice. While 
governmental authorities remain critical of the immigration-imprisonment 
phenomenon, “the state does not act on its own as if it were a monolithic and 
homogenous institution but through a bloc of actors that operate at the nexus 
between the state and civil society.”
372
 In particular, a host of private prison 
corporations, local- and foreign-government entities, financial investors, 
service providers, and prison employees have coalesced to make immigration 
imprisonment possible. This is not a surprising development. As Weaver 
observed in his analysis of government institutions, “[o]nce in place, policy 
regimes tend to spawn supportive coalitions.”
373
 The existence of these third 
parties in turn makes divergence from the prevailing imprisonment focus much 
more difficult. “Changes,” Weaver adds, “are likely to impose costs on 
politicians, program clientele, and implementers who have adapted their 
expectations and strategies to the current policy regime.”
374
 Indeed, the entities 
that have grown around the immigration-imprisonment regime have become 
deeply invested in its maintenance and have implicitly encouraged government 
officials to take expansive views of their imprisonment authority.
375
 
Perhaps there is no group that more vividly evokes a commitment to 
imprisonment than the private prison companies that own or operate a large 
percentage of the immigration-detention estate. Private prison companies 
oversee almost 17.8 percent of all federal prisoners (a significant and growing 
percentage of whom are imprisoned for committing immigration crimes) and, 
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1508 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  103:1449 
in any given year, between 40 and 50 percent of civil immigration detainees.
376
 
As profit-making enterprises, private prison companies seek the greatest return 
on their investments. To be profitable, therefore, they must keep costs down 
while maximizing revenues. An obvious way of maintaining robust revenue is 
to “ensure that prisons are not only built but also filled.”
377
 News reports claim 
that private prison companies tried to do this by engaging in “a quiet, behind-
the-scenes effort to help draft and pass Arizona Senate Bill 1070,” the 
infamous state law that the Supreme Court eventually held was largely 
unconstitutional, and that would have resulted in a vast expansion of Arizona’s 
criminalization of immigration activity.
378
 In addition, the Corrections 
Corporation of America (CCA), GEO Group, and other private prison 
companies have vigorously lobbied lawmakers. Collectively, from 2005 to 
early 2013, private prison companies spent approximately $45 million lobbying 
state and federal politicians, including key lawmakers who have advanced 




Though the largest prison corporations publicly disclaim any interest in 
expanding the prison population, their financial records indicate a keen 
awareness that more punitive laws improve their financial condition while a 
more relaxed approach toward immigration law enforcement could undermine 
their financial health. CCA, the nation’s largest private prison operator, for 
example, told its shareholders in 2004 that “[f]urther [revenue] growth is 
expected to come from increased focus and resources by the Department of 
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In 2013, the second-largest prison company, GEO Group, announced that 
“[i]mmigration reform laws which are currently a focus for legislators and 




Though private corporations are heavily involved in immigration 
imprisonment today, local governments also reap financial rewards from this 
practice. Many elected officials, especially in rural locations, view prisons as 
economic engines.
382
 Prisons in which migrants are detained are no different. 
Indeed, immigration prisons are particularly attractive to local political leaders 
because the federal government pays almost all of the costs of detention. This 
arrangement allows county and city governments to readily develop 
immigration prison revenue streams. The mayor of Oakdale, Louisiana, the 
largest town in a parish (the Louisiana equivalent of counties) of roughly 7,200 
people, vigorously lobbied INS officials during the mid-1980s to open an 
immigration prison there.
383
 The prison, Mayor George Mowad explained, 
“would lead to the ‘economic rebirth’ of Oakdale.”
384
 As the mayor saw it, 
“[i]mmigration prisons . . . are ‘a recession-proof industry,’ because if the U.S. 
economy suffered, the world economy would follow, which would lead to 
more undocumented aliens coming to the United States, and thus more 
employment for Oakdale.”
385
 Similarly, a county commissioner in 
Pennsylvania’s Perry County explained, “We tried like the dickens to get some 
of those Chinese,” referring to Chinese migrants who had recently been 
apprehended aboard a grounded ship.
386
 “We thought at one point that we were 
going to get 30 of them, but it didn’t pan out. We told the Immigration Service 
we were willing to help them out of a spot. Maybe then they’d help us out of a 
spot. . . . The big reason we’re doing all this is because we want to keep 
everybody [at the prison] working.”
387
 In a similar vein, the chairman of the 
Board of Commissioners of Irwin County in South Georgia lamented the 
prospect of a privately owned immigration prison closing: “If it closes, then 
everybody loses their jobs . . . and the inmates go back to wherever they came 
from, but we hope that it never gets to that.”
388
 It did come to that at the 
Willacy County Correctional Center, a south Texas facility run by the private 
prison operator Management Training Corporation (MTC). After years of 
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operating as a civil immigration detention center for ICE (called the Willacy 
County Processing Center), Willacy housed convicted immigration crime 
offenders for BOP when inmates rebelled in February 2015. Roughly two 
weeks after the rebellion, MTC announced that it was firing all but about 
twenty-five members of its approximately four-hundred-person staff.
389
 
Often, local governments pair up with private prison companies to jointly 
facilitate the development of an immigration prison. Border analyst Tom Barry 
explains that these “public-private prison[s]” are “publicly owned by local 
governments, privately operated by corporations, publicly financed by tax-
exempt bonds, and located in [economically] depressed communities.”
390
 The 
public-private consortium then turns its attention to securing an agreement with 
one of the various federal government agencies involved in immigration 
imprisonment—ICE, BOP, or USMS. The federal government receives prison 
beds while the local governments and private operators receive revenue.
391
 
Importantly, because public-private prison partnerships leave ownership in the 
local government’s hands, the public entities remain liable for financial 
shortfalls that arise when the revenue stream falls below the level necessary to 
operate or maintain the facility—that is, when there are not enough inmates to 
meet prison expenses.
392
 Local officials, therefore, have every reason to 




Neither private businesses nor local governments, however, can carry the 
cost of building and operating prisons alone.
394
 On the contrary, they rely 
heavily on financial investors to make the risk that goes along with such 
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complicated projects worthwhile. Financial institutions such as banks provide 
the capital necessary to build, refurbish, or expand prisons.
395
 Indeed, major 
banks in the United States have taken important, though indirect, roles in 
immigration imprisonment by supporting the private prison companies and 
local governments that actually build or operate these facilities. Wells Fargo, 
for example, invests in the GEO Group and also manages CCA’s financial 
restructuring. 
VI. 
DENATURALIZING IMMIGRATION IMPRISONMENT 
Despite its central presence in modern immigration law enforcement, 
incarceration is undeniably an extraordinary power. It is a “severe sanction,” as 
the Supreme Court has put it on multiple occasions.
396
 Short of the state’s 
authority to take a person’s life, it is the most awesome power that the state 
wields.
397
 Acknowledging that incarceration necessarily entails a severe 
deprivation of liberty that sharply departs from the western legal tradition’s 
otherwise strong claim to respect a person’s liberty,
398
 the Supreme Court has 




To better reflect the extraordinary character of imprisonment, its proper 
place in enforcing immigration law should be at the sidelines.
400
 It should, at 
most, represent the margins of governmental authority. In the context of civil 
immigration law, confinement should be prohibited unless the government can 
provide clear, articulable facts indicating that a particular migrant represents a 
danger to the public or a risk of flight that cannot be substantially ameliorated 
by alternative means, as is already the case for pretrial detention of criminal 
defendants. The same standard ought to apply to pretrial detention in the 
criminal immigration context. 
Upon conviction for an immigration crime, incarceration ought to be 
permitted only to the extent that it accomplishes some goal that the civil 
immigration law enforcement system cannot.
401
 Since neither criminal nor civil 
 
 395. See Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, Private Security Companies and the European 
Borderscapes, in THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 152, 167 (Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen & Ninna Nyberg Sørensen 
eds., 2013). 
 396. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 762 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also 
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372 (1979). 
 397. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991). 
 398. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
 399. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 553 (2003) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 
690 (2001)). 
 400. See Noferi, supra note 304 (promoting less civil immigration detention). 
 401. See Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
273, 279–80 (2010) (positing that using criminal powers “when civil penalties will do offends 
constitutional safeguards of individual liberty by tempting law enforcement to overreach”). 
1512 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  103:1449 
immigration law enforcement has much of a deterrent effect, and since 
imprisonment incapacitates a detained individual whether through civil or 
penal detention, incarceration after conviction of an immigration crime should 
be restricted to situations in which confinement promotes criminal law’s 
retributive justification. Whether retributivist aims are served must be 
considered in light of the reality that many unauthorized migrants come to the 
United States not of their own volition (as is the case of migrants brought as 
children)
402
 or for morally commendable reasons (e.g., to escape violence).
403
 
Given that imprisonment for immigration crimes is largely ineffective as a 
deterrent and that many migrants break the law for morally justifiable reasons, 
it would be appropriate to significantly reduce the sentences meted out for 
these crimes. It would even be fitting to decriminalize unauthorized border 
crossings unless “the federal government can prove that, with requisite criminal 
intent, [a migrant] engaged in an act aside from crossing the border that would 
constitute a crime.”
404
 Imprisonment should, in effect, be an extraordinary 
power resorted to only in the most exceptional of circumstances. 
Denaturalizing immigration imprisonment may appear a tall task, 
impossible or at least unrealistic in the current political environment. But it is 
not a “foregone conclusion.” Imprisonment need not be a central part of the 
immigration law enforcement regime.
405
 Just as the prison was naturalized, it 
can be denaturalized.
406
 Recent developments in criminal incarceration offer 
promising models and proof that it is possible to rewind the clock on 
imprisonment policy. In late 2013, then-Attorney General Eric Holder 
announced Justice Department plans to reduce the size of the federal prison 
population, in part by doing what would have been unthinkable for most of the 
last thirty years: “fundamentally rethinking the notion of mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug-related crimes.”
407
 Similarly, several states, including some 
known for their staunchly conservative legislatures and large prison systems, 
have reduced their prison populations.
408
 Notably, for three years running—
from 2010 to 2012—the total federal and state prison population in the United 
 
 402. See 147 CONG. REC. 15361 (2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (introducing proposed 
legislation known as the DREAM Act that “would allow children who have been brought to the 
United States through no volition of their own the opportunity to fulfill their dreams, to secure a 
college degree and legal status”). 
 403. See PORTES & RUMBAULT, supra note 44, at 23–25 (explaining that refugees and 
asylees come to the United States to avoid persecution). 
 404. Romero, supra note 402, at 275. 
 405. See Feeley, supra note 248, at 333. 
 406. See Doty & Wheatley, supra note 306, at 430 (“This system is neither automatically 
self-perpetuating nor incapable of change.”). 
 407. Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar 
Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches 
/2013/ag-speech-130812.html. 
 408. See, e.g., Shane Bauer, How Conservatives Learned to Love Prison Reform, MOTHER 
JONES (Feb. 25, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/conservatives-
prison-reform-right-on-crime. 
2015] NATURALIZING IMMIGRATION IMPRISONMENT 1513 
States declined. There were almost forty-three thousand fewer people 
imprisoned in federal or state prisons across the country at the end of 2012 than 
at the end of 2009, the year that the number of prisoners peaked.
409
 
Denaturalizing immigration imprisonment will not come easily. As Part V 
illustrated, there are numerous impediments rooted in institutional design, 
politics, and the cold realities of business affairs to turning away from 
entrenched incarceration. It is difficult to imagine that any of the entities 
currently involved in immigration imprisonment will voluntarily remove 
themselves from this thriving practice. Only external pressure can shift the 
foundations of modern immigration law enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy initiatives and laws that currently drive migrants into 
imprisonment rely on the rhetoric of migrant criminality. Arizona’s human 
smuggling crime, for example, portrays migrants who pay someone to help 
them enter the United States clandestinely as conspirators in a law-breaking 
enterprise. As a matter of law, they are treated identically to the people who 
were paid to bring the migrants into the country. In a similar vein, fast-track 
pleas, no-bail provisions, and other initiatives that radically alter traditional 
criminal processes suggest that migrants are simply too dangerous for 
government to rely on ordinary investigative methods. Likewise, Secure 
Communities, CAP, immigration detainers, and other initiatives that break 
down boundaries between criminal and civil immigration law enforcement 
suggest that that the old ways of compartmentalizing enforcement efforts into 
silos of substantive law are simply insufficient. And if the old ways of 
enforcing law’s obligations are insufficient, then it must be because the new 
threat is beyond what those traditional branches of law enforcement can police. 
In response, governments at every level turned to imprisonment to 
buttress their immigration law enforcement powers. In time, imprisonment 
embedded itself so deeply in the nation’s collective law enforcement arsenal 
that it became normal. It spawned a network of decision-making processes and 
actors that reproduce the drive to imprison. But as with the development of the 
prison itself, imprisonment as a form of immigration law enforcement is neither 
necessary nor an enforcement mechanism that has been with us since time 
immemorial. That immigration imprisonment has become naturalized is the 
result of a deliberate, identifiable series of political actions to demonize 
migrants—actions operationalized through policy decisions expanding the 
harsh consequences of immigration activity. 
Neither political actions nor policy decisions are forever. As with the 
development of prisons in the first place, what is required is a willingness to 
imagine a different path and the entrepreneurial spirit necessary to 
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operationalize it.
410
 Only then can immigration imprisonment return to the 
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